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INTRODUCTION 
Concepts of protest in Africa, like historical concepts elsewhere, 
have undergone considerable change through the last half century, and 
it is possible at present to distinguish three schools of thought. 
These are the colonialist school, the nationalist, and, for want of a 
more specific term, the revisionist. 
The first in time, the colonialist, had its roots in the attitudes 
of explorers and military corrmanders, then developed through early civil 
administrators and settlers, and ultimately was reiterated by biographers, 
historians, and Royal Commissions. In Kenya for instance, there is 
a common i deo 1 ogy that runs through the writings of Hall11 , Mei nertzhagen, 
Eliot, Cranborne, Huxley, Leakey and the Corfield Report. This school 
regarded any form of protest as a rebellion against the Europeans' bene-
ficent design to eradicate African primitivism and instill the common 
or civil law, orderly government, Christianity, capitalism, and other 
aspects of European "civilization. 11 Protest thus. was an evil with no 
redeeming quality. Its motivation stemmed from the selfish ambitions of 
chiefs and elders, the machinations of witchdoctors, the innate hostility 
or aggressiveness of certain 11 tribes, 11 base communal rituals, and from 
the general emotionalism and irrationality of a backward people. Since 
protest, in popular definition, connotes the possibility of a legitimate 
basis for opposition, the colonialist school avoided the term. Uprising, 
rebellion, revolt, riot, insurrection, disturbance, and, in the extreme, 
war were the descriptive words. 
Beginning in the late fifties, as it became obvious that Africans 
were moving rapidly and irresistibly toward independence, new concepts 
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of African protest gained the ascendency. Their beginnings in East 
African , history can be found in the writings of early humanitarians 
such as McGregor Ross, Norman Leys, and Leonard Woolf, all of whom found 
legitimacy and rationality in much of the Africans' opposition to the 
imposition and maintenance of European rule. · To them the evil was inherent 
in imperialism and colonialism rather than in the African opposition. 
The new concepts that emerged in the fifties and flowered in the sixties 
added to these antecedents a glorification of the struggle for indepen-
dence and the establishment of nationhood. The word 11 protest 11 was employed 
to describe African opposition in all its varieties from the inception of 
the European presence. The leaders of the new school for East Africa--
Carl Rosberg, Robert Rotberg, and the Dar es Salaam historians led by 
Terrence Ranger--tehded to associate all protest with nationalism. What 
Rangercalled "primary and secondary resistance" and Rotberg llresistance 
and rebellion" were in. essence what others recognized as 11 protonationalism 
and nationalism." Not surprisingly these historians collectively were 
soon regarded as the nationalist school. Joined by many young African 
historians, who in the chauvinistic climate of new nationhood naturally 
concentrated on the winning of independence, this school rolled out publi-
cations, dominated the learned journals, monopolized lecture platforms, 
and, in short, gained a popular favor no less than that enjoyed in pre-
ceding decades by the colonialist historians. 
Within the last few years, mariy young scholars, acting for the most 
part independently of one another, have found new reasons to attack the 
colonialist concepts and have become sharply critical of the nationalist 
school. Since their ideas have not coalesced as yet into a central theme, 
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they may be described temporarily as merely the revisionist historians. 
They perhaps do not yet deserve the designation of a school. In revising 
colonialist interpretations, they have employed the techniques of the 
nationalists, i.e., a minute examination of written sources, many of which 
were not available in the colonial period, and a pervasive collection of 
oral evidence. In most instances, however, they have sought and inter-
preted this information without the preconceived, ideological theories 
and values attributed to the nationalists. While often adopting nationalist 
phraseology such as "primary and secondary resistance, 11 these historians 
have developed the new terminology of sub-imperialism, collaboration, 
communicators, and modernizers. Basic to their approach is the rejection 
of the thesis of a continuity of opposition through the entire colonial 
period and the tie of all protest to nationalism. They deny that all or 
even a significant portion of African protest embodied the cultural cohe-
siveness, unity of purpose, and specific goals essential to nationalism. 
At the same time, however, some have undermined the importance of protest 
by suggesting that African collaboration, an opposing theme, is perhaps 
even more deserving of consideration. A few have turned from an emphasis 
on Africans to a study of non-European minority communities, such as the 
Asians and Arabs, to explore their contributions to the overall history, 
including protest. Like revisionists at any time, these historians in 
their entirety have not been popular. While editorial boards and history 
departments are dominated by adherents of the nationalist school, it has 
been difficult for them to publish and to hold responsible positions. 
Because of the increasing attention given to African protest, 
largely through nationalist writings, the Program of Eastern African 
Studies at Syracuse University decided to devote its spring seminar in 1971 
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to the subject. At the suggestion of Alan Smith, the new Assistant Pro-
fessor of African history, papers were solicited from younger scholars 
in the United States, Britain, and Africa who had just completed exten-
sive field research and could be expected to introduce fresh concepts. 
The authors were invited to preside over discussions of their papers, and 
the sessions were held biweekly. As the semester progressed, it became 
apparent that the papers as a whole were not only innovative and challenging, 
but highly critical of the prevailing nationalist themes. It was a revi-
sionist seminar. 
The authors of the three papers presented in this volume were typical. 
They had received intensive training in African history at universities 
with established African study programs, had lived in Africa for relatively 
long periods of time, and had recently returned after independent research 
in the field to write dissertations and begin teaching careers. All were 
eager to publish their findings and conclusions of African protest. 
Robert M. Maxon, Assistant Professor of History at West Virginia 
University, has an unusually broad base for scholarship relative to Kenya. 
After a B.A. at Duke University in 1961 and brief enrollments at Columbia 
University, the University of London, and Makerere in Kampala, he served 
four years as Education Officer for the Government of Kenya In 1965 
he began studies for a Ph.D. in African history at Syracuse University. 
While there he directed the teaching of Swahili to Peace Corps trainees 
and was a research assistant in the Program of Eastern African Studies. 
During 1968-69 Maxon completed in Kenya the field research for his dis-
sertation, "British Rule in Gusiiland, 1907-63, 11 and in 1972 he received 
the Ph.D. Maxon is a competent scholar. As a graduate student he was 
awarded Woodrow Wilson, Fulbright-Hays, and Shell International fellowships. 
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His publications include four articles on the Gusii, another article on 
John Ainsworth, and the book A Guide to the Kenya National Archives, of 
which he was co-author. 
Painstaking in research, naturally skeptical of others' generaliza-
tions, and very independent in his approach, Maxon as an historian tends 
to defy classification. In the following article, 11 Early Gusii Resistance 
to British Rule, 1905-14, 11 he shows neither the pro-settler and anti-
resistance views characteristic of colonialist historians, nor the ideo-
logical assumptions associated with the nationalists. Much of his article 
is devoted to a correction of statements on Gusii protest by an earlier 
historian, Audrey Wipper, whose views on the whole coincide with those of 
the colonialist school, and whose research, in Maxon's view, was quite 
inadequate. Instead of Ranger I s II primary resistance, 11 Maxon uses the 
phrase "early resistance," and he makes no attempt to tie this incipient 
Gusii protest to nationalism. On the other hand, he does not specifically 
dissociate the resistance from a nationalist movement. Though not men-
tioning the word 11 collaboration, 11 he asserts that the Gusii response to 
British rule was neither completely hostile, nor completely friendly. In 
these ways Maxon appears simply as a revisionist without the usual pro-
nounced anti-nationalist bias. Though convincing throughout, Maxon's article 
deserves some criticism. He leaves the impression, especially in view of 
Strayer's and Steinhart's detailed analyses, that he should have devoted 
less attention to Wipper's mistakes and more to a description of Gusii 
motivation. 
Robert W. Strayer, Assistant Professor of History at New York State 
University College, Brockport, should be considered a leading authority on 
mission history in East Africa. His interest in the subject is long-standing. 
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He was raised in a Pennsylvania family and environment in which missions 
played an important role. He received a B.A. at Wheaton College in 1964 
and an M.A. at the University of Wisconsin in 1966. The next two years 
he and his wife spent in Ethiopia as Peace Corps volunteers, and during 
that time they traveled widely in East Africa. In 1968 Strayer returned 
to Wisconsin for predoctoral studies in African history. The following 
year he explored mission archives in Britain and then moved to Kenya for 
five months of field research on the history of the Church Missionary Society 
Since receiving a Ph.D. in 1971, Strayer has written two articles on mis-
sions in Africa and a book-length manuscript on protest in Kenya, all of 
which are forthcoming publications. He now has an award from the SUNY 
Research Foundation for the preparation of a second book on the history 
of an Anglican mission community in colonial Kenya. 
Strayer I s article, 11 Mi ss ions and African Protest: a Case Study from 
Kenya, 1875-1935, 11 is more easily identifiable than Maxon's as a revision-
ist writing. Strayer may borrow the nationalist phrase "primary resistance" 
and agree with John I1iffe 1 s thesis that 11 colonial rule cannot be seen as 
a process of European initiative and African response. 11 But he devotes 
much detail to the subject of collaboration, which, in his view, is essen-
tial to an understanding of the subsequent protest. He expressly refutes 
the nationalist hypothesis that missions were attractive, especially in 
the initial stages, only to outcasts, exiles, and old women. He also 
clearly dissociates African protest, at least in the mission sphere, with 
nationalism and, to some degree, with anti-colonialism. Anti-mission pro-
test, he found, was a result of cultural differences and a variety of 
political and economic aims very few of which could be associated with 
nationalist aspirations. Strayer's title is misleading since a case study, 
in the usual sense, is concerned with one people in a single locality. 
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The peoples under his purview range from the coastal Rabai to the high-
lands Kikuyu, and his article is really a survey over a large area. But 
it is obvious that Strayer has examined a wide range of sources and that 
his conclusions are derived from the evidence rather than any preconceived 
conceptions. 
Edward I. Steinhart is currently Assistant Professor of History at 
the University of Texas at Austin. He did his graduate work at UCLA and 
at Northwestern, where he received his Ph.D. in 1971. He is a scholar 
of diverse interests. His published articles range from discussions of 
contemporary student movements i.n South Africa to considerations of the 
broad topic of feudalism in Africa. His main interest, however, remains 
the Lacustrine kingdoms of western Uganda. During 1968 and 1969 he worked 
in the national archives of Uganda and conducted a series of interviews 
in Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole. At the moment he is revising his doctoral 
dissertation, entitled 11 Transiti on In Western Uganda: 1891-1901 , 11 
adding additional material, in anticipation of publication. 
The title of Steinhart's article, 11 The Nyangire Rebellion of 1907: 
Anti-colonial Protest and the Nationalist Myth" is revealing of his pro-
fessional view. He is obviously a revisionist. Unlike Maxon and Strayer, 
who were only indirectly critical of the nationalist school, Steinhart 
has purposely posed as a chief critic. His detailed foreword, in which 
he distinguishes between colonialist and nationalist interpretations and 
expounds the revisionist arguments, marks him as an iconoclast with a 
keen perception. In his description of the 1907 rebellion in Bunyoro, 
Steinhart mixes the terminology of the nationalist authors by using, in 
one instance, the phrase "primary resistance" and, in another, the words 
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"resistance and rebellion." But he also employs the revisionist termino-
logy of "sub-imperialism," "communicators," and "modernizers" and, like 
Strayer, gives great attention to collaboration. Throughout he is critical 
of nationalist ideology. His description of the Nyangire uprising is 
quite detailed, but well balanced, and on the whole his arguments on Afri-
can protest are revealing and convincing. 
Like most cha 11 engi ng and thought provokJ ng writings, Steinhart I s 
article .is open to criticism. In offering new concepts as substitutes for 
those in force, there is a tendency to over-generalize, to attribute posi-
tions and values to others which are only partly true, and Steinhart, with 
some justification, will be vigorously criticized by some adherents of the 
nationalist school. Mo_reover, he apparently was inspired before under-
taking this study by D. Barnett, John Saul, and a few others who have 
described peasant unrest as a major cause of African protest, and in his 
concluding sentences Steinhart proposes a populist hypothesis as a basis 
for further study. If pursuing this methodology, he may be subject to 
the same criticism that he levels at the nationalists, i.e., seeking facts 
to justify a theory as distinct from formulating conclusions on the basis 
of the evidence. Though he attempts to thwart this cri ti ci criticismby ca 11 i ng 
for pursuance only of a "myth of populist insurrection,11 with the implica-
tion that it will produce valuable new insights and contribute ultimately 
to an objective view of African protest, he is advocating, in fact, what 
most historians would not accept, that in research the end can justify 
the means. 
In presenting these three articles, there has been no attempt by the 
editor to impose on the authors a common punctuation, style of writing, 
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or footnote citation. Minor inconsistencies, so far as they could be 
ascertained, were eliminated, but with their exception, the articles 
have been published in the form in which they were submitted. 
Robert G. Gregory 
Syracuse University 
MISSIONS AND AFRICAN PROTEST: A CASE STUDY FROM KENYA, 1875 - 1935 
Robert W. Strayer 
African protest against European mission activity has been generally 
studied only at the point of rupture with parent mission bodies leading 
to the formation of independent schools and churches. Yet a recent 
examination of independent churches has indicated that such breakaway 
groups represented only the tip of an iceberg of African disaffection 
th 1w, m, ss,ons. Furthermore, various types of opposition existed out-
side as well as within the mission community. Missions, therefore, have 
constituted an important focus of African protest during the colonial 
period and afford an opportunity to examine the kind of strains, tensions 
and conflicts engendered by a "clash of cultures" under colonial conditions. 
The roots of such African opposition date virtually from the inception 
of mission activity and derive from a wide variety of sources. "Primary 
resistance" and later movements of political protest were directed on 
occasion against missions as well as against the colonial government. 
Some of those who initially collaborated with missionaries for their own 
economic or political ends later found this association more a liability 
than an asset and so came to oppose the missionary presence. Finally, 
many who saw in the mission a means of 11 improvement 11 became disillusioned 
and frustrated with their inability to chart their own course to progress 
within the mission community. While all of these sources of opposition 
to missions were conditioned by virtue of occurring within a European-
dominated colonial society, the protests expressing this opposition were 
1David Barrett, Schism and Renewal in Africa (Nairobi, 1968), p. 179. 
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by no means always 11 nationalist 11 or even explicitly "anti-colonial" 
in character. Rather, groups and individuals responded to the missionary 
presence in terms of their own goals and interests and in terms of their 
various perceptions of the relationship between missions and colonial 
regimes. 
To illustrate the nature of anti-mission protest, I have chosen to 
examine African responses to the presence of the Anglican Church 
1 
Missionary Society (CMS) in central and eastern Kenya until the mid-1930's. 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the primary focus of Anglican 
efforts was on the coast in the freed slave settlements of Freretown 
and Rabai as well as among the Arab, Swahili and Indian communities of 
Mombasa. After 1900 the focus of CMS work shifted steadily to the central 
highlands, an area inhabited by the Kikuyu and related peoples and 
increasingly subjected to the encroachment of European settlers. Outside 
of these areas, the CMS also established itself among the peoples of the 
immediate coastal hinterland, particularly the Giriama, Rabai, and Digo 
groups, and in the Taita hills about 100 miles northwest of Mombasa. 
Since much anti-mission protest resulted from disillusionment at the 
failure or inability of mission agencies to fulfill the roles which Africans 
expected of them, it wi 11 be necessary at the outset to examine briefly 
the attractions which missions held for a wide variety of African individuals 
1 While occasional references · have been made to the female circumc1s1on 
crisis of 1929, it will not be treated in detail, partly because it is the 
most well-known example of anti-mission protest in Kenya. Also, it is 
an extraordinarily complex set of events and could not adequately be 
examined within the confines of this paper. 
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and groups. The range of motives involved in the pattern of African 
response to the_ CMS makes it necessary to modify the frequently 
stated hypothesis that those whose interests were engaged by missions, 
particularly in the early days, were merely the 11 deracines of tribal 
society. 111 While mission stations were indeed viewed as refuges 
by 11 outcasts. . . exiles or-old women, 11 they were al so regarded by 
others in rather different ways. 
The political implications of the missionary presence were doubt-
less uppermost in the minds of African rulers as they made their initial 
contacts with the white strangers. Those who responded positively to 
mission overtures were generally mindful of the missionaries' contacts 
with those more powerful forces in the outside -world and hoped to reap 
certain advantages for themselves or their communities by establishing 
friendly relations with the newcomers. 
In the pre-colonial period it was often the influence which 
missionaries were believed to have with the Arab authorities in Mombasa 
or Zanzibar that provided an early point of contact with coastal peoples. 
The Rabai provide a case in point. The friendly reception accorded to 
J. Krapf and J. Rebmann, the two earliest CMS missionaries in East Africa, 
by the Rabai in the mid-19th century, owed much to their concern for their 
rel ati onshi p with the ru.l ers of Mombasa. In Coupland I s words, they 
were 11 too close to Mombasa with its Baluchi garrison to ignore the fact 
that Krapf and his colleagues enjoyed the favor and protection of the 
1 L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. Burden of Empire (New York, 1967), p. 276. 
-4-
1 Governor." · The Rabai came to view the CMS as a potential intermediary 
or broker between themselves and Arab power on the coast. Thus, in 1879 
the elders of Kaya Fimboni in Rabai country begged the mission to send them 
a teacher and build them a church. Many were even willing to discard their 
charms to persuade the mission of their sincerity. It was soon discovered, 
however, that their real motive was to get rid of a group of Swahilis 
living in their village. It was their hope that CMS missionary H.K. Binns 
could persuade the Wal i or governor, of Mombasa to oust the intruders. 
Binns' response to this situation was typica-1 of much missionary frustra-
t i on: 
I reasoned with the old men · and asked: them how it was 
that they never came to me except they were in some 
trouble and wanted me to help them out of it, but as 
to coming to hear the Gospel preached, they never did 
and in times of plenty they hardly ever came near our 
village.2 
If the initial political relevance of CMS missionaries to African 
societies lay in their connections with coastal Arab authorities, the 
advent of formal British rule after 1895 meant, of course, that missionaries 
were viewed as an integral part of this new political reality. It should 
be remembered that most African societies in Kenya lacked traditionally 
sanctioned "chiefs" so that the British were anxious to enlist the cooper-
ation of anyone with a wider than local prominence, however that prominence 
had been achieved. 3 A number of such individuals, and some who had simply 
1Reginald Coupland, East Africa and Its Invaders (Oxford, 1938), _p. 409. 
For a 17th century example of coastal peoples' concern about their political 
relationship with Mombasa, see Coupland, pp. 63-65. 
2CMS/03, Binns to CMS, August 7, 1879. 
3 For a comparison of the type of people among whom the British found their mai n 
allies in Kikuyu and Kamba country respectively, see J.F.S. Munro, "The Macha ko s. 
Kamba under British Rule, 1889-1939." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin 
1968, p. 79. He suggests that broker-traders were the most prominent British 
allies among the Kamba, while military leaders played this role in Kikuyu society 
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ingratiated themselves with the British, seemed to believe that a positive 
response to missionaries would serve to solidify their standing with the 
colonial authorities. There were others, however, who apparently saw 
less need thus to prove their loyalty owing to a previously established 
relationship with the British or to a particularly strong local power 
base. 
An excellent example of one who initially "collaborated" with both 
government and missions was Karuri wa Gakure, who in the decade or so 
prior to British conquest had established his prominence in the Murang'a 
or Fort Hall district of Kikuyuland through his reputation as an arbi-
trator, warrior and trader as well as through a short term military 
alliance with the European trader,John Boyes. 1 This latter connection 
had sufficiently impressed Karuri with the value of cooperation with 
the white man that in 1900 he readily entered into an agreement with 
the Protectorate officials, which enabled the British to bring Murang'a 
under their control largely without the use of punitive expeditions. Since 
the CMS and other missions were attempting to establish themselves in 
Kikuyuland at this time, it was not unreasonable for Karuri to pursue a 
friendly policy toward them as a means of consolidating his alliance with 
the British. Thus, in September 1901, he invited A. W. McGregor, the first 
CMS missionary in Kikuyuland, to visit his residence at Tutho and subse-
quently provided a number of students for McGregor's school. A number of 
1
university College, Nairobi-Research Project Archives (UCN:RPA), B/2/2(2), 
"Biography ofKaruri, 11 by Charles M. Mucaha. Transcript of interviews 
also included. 
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other aspiring individuals did likewise and in 1908 McGregor baptized 
eight young men, a 11 of whom had been sent to the mission by 1 oca 1 11 chiefs 11 
. 1 
or prominent men. 
There were those, however, who saw the coming of the missionaries 
as a potential threat to their already established positions. Karanja 
wa Mariti, who had been station headmaster at Fort Smith in southern 
Kikuyuland since 1895, firmly refused to allow the CMS to establish a 
station in the immediate vicinity of the fort when approached by McGregor 
in 1900. 2 While the reasons for his refusal are not altogether clear, 
it is certainly possible that already enjoying the confidence of the 
administration, he felt himself in a sufficiently strong position not 
to need this additional indication of his loyalty. Similarly, Gutu 
wa Kibetu, the powerful Paramount Chief of Embu, was decidedly reluctant 
to see the CMS establish itself in his area, fearing correctly that 
missionaries would act as spies for the colonial government. While he 
was unable to prevent the mission from obtaining land in Embu, he did 
manage to have them located a considerable distance from his own residence, 
unlike Karuri who had invited the CMS to settle at his own headquarters. 3 
1 KNA:CMS/1/625, Weithega Log Book; CMS/1908/58, Mombasa Diocesan Magazine, 
Apri 1 , 1908. 
2 KNA: DC/MKS/1/5/1, Ukamba Province Quarterly and Special Report, December, 
1909; Interview with Chief Josiah Njonjo, January 28, 1970. 
3 KNA: PC/CP. 1/1, Central Province Political Record Book; PC/CP.1/5/1, 
Office of PC, Nyeri to Chief Secretary, January 19, 1917; Daudi Petero, 
Jubilee A.C. Kigari and A.C. Kabare (1910-1960), n.d., p. 21. 
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If the oresence of missionaries had political implications for 
African societies, CMS activity also touched their economic interests 
in a variety of ways. In the pre-colonial period, missionaries were 
viewed on occasion by Africans as a potential element in their network 
of trading relationships. Krapf, for example, was warmly welcomed by 
Kivoi, a leading Kamba trader, who was engaged in extensive commercial 
relations with the coast. Kivoi told Krapf of his desire to conduct 
this trade via the Tana River in order to bypass the peoples of the 
coastal hinterland with whom he was competing for direct access to the 
markets of Mombasa. 1 He doubtless hoped that Krapf's contacts with 
the Governor of Mombasa and with the coastal peoples would further these 
commercial interests. Similar considerations may have motivated the 
early receptiveness to mission overtures of certain Miji Kenda peoples, 
such as the Rabai mentioned earlier, as well as the Diga and Giriama. 
In 1875, for example, CMS missionaries on the coast observed that a group 
of Giriama villages north of Rabai were asking for mission teachers 
"though their predominant motive may be (as almost confessed by them-
selves) the desire that traders in cloth, knives, etc., may settle among 
them. "2
In other ways as well the mission could serve the economic interests 
of African people. The freed slaves who constituted the bulk of the popu-
lation at Freretown and Rabai saw the mission most fundamentally as a 
1Johann Ludwig Krapf, Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours (Boston, 
1860), pp. 238-242; John Lamphear, "The Kamba and the orthern Mr1ma Coast, 11 
in Pre-Colonial African Trade by Richard Gray and David Birmingham (London, 
1970), pp. 75-102. 
2 CMS, Proceedings, 1874-75, p. 39. For a similar case among the Diga, see CMS, 
Extracts of Annual Letters, W. A. Crabtree, October 29, 1892. 
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source of economic security. In the interior, missionaries were 
frequently regarded as employers from whom wages were demanded in 
return for attendance at school or church. As will be shown.later, 
both of these groups protested vigorously when missionaries were 
unwilling or unable to fulfill these roles. 
A final economic attraction of missions for Africans can be 
summarized in the term "improvement," a theme which emphasizes African 
initiative for chanqe and represents a creative accommodation to 
colonial rule. Education was clearly among the most prominent of the 
means of improvement since it was a gateway to employment in the new 
occupations created by the colonial state and its associated enter-
prises. Since education in Kenya was for most of the colonial period 
virtually a mission monopoly, a growing number of people came to view 
favorably at least a nominal associaiton with the mission. 
A major indication of the desire for improvement through education 
lay in African insisteijce on ever more and better education. As early 
as 1904, one CMS missionary at Freretown could report that a "keen desire 
for an advanced education is manifested by many of the lads. 111 Shortly 
before the war, a number of CMS agents petitioned the mission to provide 
a more advanced education as well as a boarding school for their children. 2 
Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the spirit of "improve-
ment" lay in the rapid proliferation of outschools or "bush schools," 
which grew up around each of the mission's central stations as well as on 
settlers' farms and in urban areas, particularly in the post-World War I 
1
cMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Edwin Luckock, January 4, 1904. 
2
cMS/1918/30, Martin to Manley, May 1, 1918. 
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period. For example, the number of outschools around Kabeta station 
in southern Kikuyuland rose from three in 1917 to eleven in 1926, while 
in Fort Hall District, there were seven CMS outschools in 1920 and twenty 
l 
only five years 1 ater. · It is of the utmost ·importance to realize that 
this proliferation of outschools was accomplished almost exclusively at 
African initiative and represented one of the major achievements of the 
"age of improvement." Local communities carefully nurtured these in-
stitutions, constructing their buildings first in thatch, then with mud 
brickscks, and finallyn  11 y erecting With enormous pride a stone bui 1 ding with a 
tin roof. 
While manv Africans had associated themselves with the CMS as a 
means of pursuing some positive economic or political goal, others saw 
in the mission a means of escape from war, famine, political upheaval, 
family problems and increasingly from the demands of a colonial state. 
Around the turn of the century, for example, famine drove up to 900 
people daily to seek food at Freretown, while some 2,000 settled at 
least temporarily near the mission. 2 Likewise, . a large number of runaway 
slaves -- 900 by 1888 -- escaped from their Arab or Giriama masters 
to seek refuge at Rabai where many of them became assimilated among the 
mission's adherents. 3 The CMS station at Taveta similarly became a haven 
for political and famine refugees from a wide variety of surrounding 
h . 4 et ethnicc groups. 
1 KNA: KBU/11, 19, Kiamba District Annual , Reports; 1917-18, 1926; . FH/1, 5, 
Fort Ha 11 District Annua 1 Reports, 1920-21 , 1925. 
2 CMS/1899/90, 91, Binns to Baylis, April 10, 20, 1899. 
3CMS/1899/17, Binns to Hardinge, December 7 1898. . 4 Tayeta Chronicle, Jan., 1900. A census taken in late 1899 revealed the following 
ethnic distribution amonq the settlement's 312 residents: Masai-89; Taveta-72; 
Chagga-58; Taita-29; Ugweno-24; Ukamba-21; Kahe-9; others-10. 
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With the establishment of British rule and the creation of a 
settler-oriented economy, the demand for labor from settlers, chiefs and 
the administration itself was the form in which many people experienced 
the imposition of the new regime most directly. Recognized association 
with mission schools often served to shield individuals from these 
demands as missionaries were frequently able to negotiate arrangements 
with local district officers. whereby properly registered students were 
excused from most or a 11 of these demands. for 1 a bor. Given this s i tua-
ti on, it is not surprising that a number .of young men viewed the mission 
school as a means of escaping the irksome labor demands of their new 
rulers. Government officials frequently complained that they did so with 
1 
some. success. 
During the First World War a large number of young men sought asso-
ciation with mission schools in order to avoid conscription into the 
Carrier Corps. In CMS schools this was reflected in a dramatic jump in 
attendance. figures. Total enrollment grew from 1332 in 1913 to 2267 in 
2 .. 1914, and again to 3304 in 1916. Many observers echoed the G1r1ama 
District Officer who wrote: "It is certain that many able-bodied men 
have· recently started to read merely to escape from Carrier Corps and 
other work. "3 
A final cluster of motives that attracted people to the mission 
1 KNA: KBU/7, Daqorett Annual Report, 1915-16; NYI/10, Nyeri Political Records. 
2 CMS, Proceedinos, 1913-14, p. 62; 1914-15, p. xxiii; 1916-17, p. 41. 
3KNA: Coast Province 20/136, Giriama Handing Over Report, May 14, l9l8. 
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can be lumped together as religious or personal in nature. Some 
individuals seem to have been attracted simply by curiosity at the 
1 
novelty of the missionary enterprise. For others, the techniques of 
literacy seemed to · have a supernatural dimension. Consider Joma 
Kenyatta's assertion that "Education, especially reading and writing, 
was regarded as the white man's magic and thus young men were very 
2 
eager to acquire the new magical power. 11 Missionaries did not always 
discourage the view of education as maaic. J. A. Wray, for example, 
gave oublic demonstrations of the white man's ability to make paper 
talk by writing the name of some object on a piece of paper, following 
which one of his students would hand him the object, all without a word. 
Wrayobserved that this technique was effective in stimulatirig a desire 
t d 3 to rea . . 
In some areas, missionaries themselves were thought to possess 
such supernatural power as to give or withhold rain at will. When one 
missionary asked the Taita oeople near his station in 1907 why they did 
not send their children to school, he reported them as replying: "Yes, 
we will all come, if you will give us some rain." 4 Again, missionaries 
did not discouraqe the view that rain could be supernaturally influenced, 
for they fifmly believed so themselves. There were many examples of 
1 . . Taveta Chron, cl e·, October 1899.; CMS/1891 / 54, Stegga 11 to Lang, January 13, 1891 . 
2 Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (New York, 1962), p. 262. 
3J. A. Wray, Kenya, Our Newest Colony (London, n.d.), p. 44 
4 . . CMA, Extracts of Annual Letters, R. A. Maynard, November 30, 1908. 
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missionaries' prayers for rain and of fluctuations in school and church 
attendance on the basis of their successes or failures. 
Such, then, were the attractions of the CMS for the African 
societies of central and eastern Kenya. Many, however, perceived the 
mission as a threat rather than an opportunity virtually from the be-
ginning of contact. Others came to such a view only after some experience 
with the Anglican missionaries. Still others sought to modify certain 
CMS policies and control mission institutions without altogether breaking 
with the mission. In turning directly to these various manifestations 
of African protest, it will be well to distinguish between those expres-
sions of hostility to the CMS which arose outside the mission community 
and those forms of antaqoni sm and conflict which were generated within 
it. Althouah these two sources of anti-mission sentiment shared certain 
common grievances, the articulation of these grievances remained largely 
separate until the late 1920 1 s. The outbreak of the circumcision crisis 
in 1929 represented in certain respects a merging of these two strands 
of anti-mission protest, a conjuncture which accounts in part for the 
depth and intensity of that controversy. 
One of the major external sources of opposition to the CMS 
derived from the elders of African societies and was basically cultural 
in nature. Those who identified with the mission, after all, found them-
selves part of a group which was sharply distinguished from the surround-
ing society This differentiation was based largely on a rejection of 
certain aspects of their traditional cultures and on .the hostility which 
this rejection engendered. Fundamentally responsible for this situation 
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were the missionaries themselves. Their view of African culture drove 
them to demand far-reaching changes in the beliefs and behavior of their 
adherents "So immoral are many of the customs of tribal life, 11 wrote 
one Presbyterian missionary, "that he [the African convert] is constrained 
to hold a different relationship to his tribe than non-Christians have ... 
They are bound to form in one sense a new community ... " 1 Missionaries 
and their early converts, moreover, frequently inststed on taking the 
reliqious offensive against their pagan neighbors, sometimes deliberately 
desecrating traditional sacred places. McGregor himself on occasion 
went about with a skull tied on a string, threatening to touch people who 
refused to attend church. 2 
Two related consequences flowed from such beliefs and actions. First, 
many of those who had associated themselves with the mission, for whatever 
reasons, became seriously alienated from their people. Johana Muturi, 
one of the first Christians in the Fort Hall area, observed that in the 
early days conversion meant that one was regarded as being "lost. 113 A 
CMS missionary noted the same feeling among the Giriama. "The cry among 
these oeople is that if their children become Christians, they are lost 
to them. 114 No one has better captured this sense of alienation than James 
Naugi in The River Between: 
1Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), Ed. 1912-19, CMS answers to Orr's Questions, April 29, 1912. 2ucN-RPA: D/3/2(2), H.S.K. Mwaniki, "The Impact of British Rule in Embu, 1906-23; 11 
CMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Miss F. Deed, Dec. 18, 1905; Matthew Mwangi, 
"History of Weithaga. 11 
3 St. Paul's Divinity College, Research Project, Johana Muturu interviewed by 
Eliud Kariithi, Auqust, 1965. 4 CMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Miss F. Deed, August, 1904. 
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Joshua ... was then a young man who ran from the 
hills and went to live with the white man in the 
newly established Mission. He feared the revenge 
of the hills; the anger of his friends, betrayed. 
In Siriana [Mission] he found a sanctuary and the 
white man's power and magic. He learned to read 
and write. The new faith worked in him till it came 
to possess him wholly. He renounced his tribe's 
magic, power and ritual. He turned to and felt 
the deep ·presence of the one God. Had he not qiven 
the white· man power over all? ... He realized the 
ignorance of his people. He felt the depth of all 
the darkness in which they lived.1 
Associated with the alienation . of many mission adherents :. was 
the hostility of their elders. Among the Kikuyu it was mission opposi-
tion to both male and female circumcision and the associated initiation 
rites that produced the most intense antagonism. The depth of feeling 
that threats to female circumcision in particular produced may be judged 
by the following comment: 
You white men came among us and we seeing that you were 
good men welcomed you with both hands; we readily 
do all that you wish us to do ... But in this matter 
of our girls we cannot see eye to eye to you and we 
cannot agree to obey you even if you attempt to coerce 
us.2 
Thouqh missionaries frequently performed circumcision on boys, such an 
operation was referred to as a Swahili custom and the practice in no way 
satisfied the initiation requirements of the Kikuyu. So great was the 
exasperation of parents that on occasion they used force to remove their 
children from the mission. Around 1913, for example, a number of boys 
slightly under the age for circumcision were captured from a CMS station 
in Embu and circumcised prematurely to make certain that they would be 
1James Ngugi, The River Between, p. 33. 
2 PCEA: Nyeri District Counci 1 and Education Cammi ttee, Minutes of Nyeri 
Native District Council, June 4, 1921. 
properly initiated. Their age group was then called Kimate or the 
l 
captured ones. Such actions may be regarded as "protests of conser-
vation," stimulated by a 11 sense of impending peril 11 to deeply held 
2 
cultural values. The focus of these protests was naturally limited 
to the area in which the threatened values were practiced and thus may 
have strenqthened particularist as opposed to national loyalties. 
It would be a mistake to conclude from this that African elders 
were totally ooposed to change or completely rejected formal education. 
Rather, their hostility grew out of a determination to resist the 
wholesale cultural tranformation which the missionaries demanded of 
their children. Consider, for example, the statement made by a group 
of Taveta men to the CMS in 1904: 
We wish to be tauqht, but we do not wish to be com-
pelled to give up the things we are accustomed to, 
such as drinking beer, having several wives and so 
on, but to be taught little by little so that after-
wards we may come to understand ourselves about 
these things. 
A similar selectivity informed the attitude of a number of Kikuyu elders 
who discussed the status of mission adherents with administrative officials 
in 1912. They stated that they would encourage their children to go to 
the mission for education, althouqh they indicated a preference for a 
government secular school. But they absolutely balked when matters touching 
1 UCN-RPA: D/3/2(2). H.S.K. Mwaniki, 11 The Impact of British Rule in Embu, 1906-23. 11 2For this concept, see Ali A. Mazrui, 11 Toward a Theory of Protest," in Protest 
and Power in Black Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (New York, 
1970), p. 1185. 
3 CMS, Proceedinos, 1904, p. 89. 
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the integrity of the family were at stake. In particular, they refused 
to consider giving up the children of a Christian widow to her new 
husband upon remarriage, an action which would mean the loss of such 
1 
children to the family of the dead husband. Thus, when the young men 
during the 1920 1 s and later insisted on separating modern education from 
the cultural demands of the missionaries, they were in a sense following 
in the footsteps of their fathers. 
Anti-mission protest was not only cultural but also political in 
nature, for missionaries were frequently seen as an integral part of 
the European threat to the sovereignty of African communities. Thus, 
the Mazuri rebellion of 1895-96 involved attacks on the CMS center at 
Freretown as well as on government posts. 2 The mission, after all, had 
been a thorn in the side of slave-owning coastal Arabs for some two 
decades through its willingness to harbor runaway slaves. 3 Relations 
between the missionaries and the Arabs had often hovered on the brink 
of violence so that it was not unreasonable for the Arab rebels to 
reqard mission stations as legitimate objects of attack. 
A similar situation prevailed during the Giriama rising of 1914 
when attacks on CMS stations as well as on mission adherents were an 
integral part of this rebellion against British rule. Furthermore, 
preparations for the rising had included an oath to kill anyone wearing 
foreign clothes. 4 Such expressions of protest were rooted in a basic 
1 KNA: Coast Province 64/252A, Northcote to PC, Fort Hall, n.d. 
2 G.H. Munqeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966), p. 24. 
For a consideration of mission-Arab relations during this period, see Norman R. Bennet 
"The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1874-1894," Boston University Papers on 
African History, (Boston, 1964). 
4 KNA: Coast Province 5/336, District Commissioner to Acting Provincial Commissioner , 
Mombasa, Sept. 13, 1914; C. Dundas: "Report on the Gi ri ama Rising; 11 Coast Pro vi nee 
20/136, Handing Over Report, Nyi ka District, Nov. 13, 1915; G. S. Ngombo, 11 A Report on 
Oral Research on the Giriama Rising of 1914, 11 an unpublished paper. 
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fact of life which missionaries were not always quick to perceive: 
that in colonial situations cultural issues could very readily become 
political ti ca 1 ones. 
A rather different form of political opposition to missions was 
exoressed by government appointed chiefs. Far from wishing the 
destruction of the colonial system, such individuals frequently regarded 
missionaries as a threat to their position within that system. While 
many chiefs had welcomed missionaries during the period of political 
adjustments following the establishment of British rule in their respective 
areas, serious antagonisms soon developed in a number of places. This 
hostility was reflected in the chiefs' attempts to limit or retard the 
flow of their people to the mission. Karuri went so far as to prohibit 
use of the CMS outschools, while Gutu tried on one occasion to levy 
f . h h 1nes on t ose rea 1ng at t the mission.
Such developments were not altogether surprising, for the mission, 
considered as a separate community of missionaries and African adherents, 
had definite political implications. The presence of a European at the 
head of such a community meant that its members had an alternative means 
of contact with the colonial administration, particularly on matters 
involving quarrels with chiefs. H. D. Hooper, veteran of ten years 
experience in Kikuyuland (1916-26), commented on this problem: 
To the mission adherents ... the missionary . 
presented a heaven-s ent opportunity of taking 
his case over the heads of chiefs and elders, 
since it was logical in his eyes to assume 
1cMS/1907/44, Conference Review of 1906; KNA: CMS/1/625, Weithoga Logbook, 
November, December 1906, May 1907; KNA: CMS/1/639, Kabare Logbook, July 12, 
1915. 
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that being of the same race, the missionary's 
advocacy would weigh more heavily with the 
District Officer than would the chief's allega-
tions ... The Chiefs, however, came to recog-
nize the insidious threat to their authority 
from such means of bypassing their local juris-
diction. 
Missionaries, moreover, often reported the chiefs' misdeeds to the 
administration. And in the early days when chiefly power was unchecked 
by officially recognized councils of elders or by frequent touring of 
European officials, abuses were common. Finally, mission students were 
being increasingly used by the government as hut and poll counters, 
clerks, interpreters and medical agents. These people were much less 
under the influence of chiefs than his njama or retainers, who had 
previously performed such lower level administrative functions. McGregor 
reported in 1912 that his pupils had filled many of these positions in 
the Fort Hall district and noted Karuri's displeasure at the sight of 
these young men running all over his district with orders from the 
government. 2 
If chiefs can be regarded as disillusioned political collaborators 
with missionar,es, there were also disillusioned economic collaborators, 
for the failure or inability of a missionary to perform an expected 
economic function could provoke African hostility. J. A. Wray, founder 
of the initially unsuccessful Jaita mission in 1883, quoted the people of 
1 CMS,Accession 85, H. D. Hooper typescript, pp. 15-16. 
2cMS/1913/16, Annual Letter: A. W. McGregor, December 12, 1912. 
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Sagalla as telling him: "White man, you are living in our country, but 
you don't buy our ivory, cattle or slaves; neither do you pay our 
children for coming to school. We feel we are not getting the profit 
1 out of you we had hoped for." At Kigari in Embuland about 50 students 
went on strike in 1911, a few days after the opening of the school,when 
they discovered that they were not to be paid for thus obliging the Euro- 
peans. 2 While missionaries regarded such demands as ludicrous, it was 
hardly unreasonable for Africans to view missionaries as employers, since 
many of them had been enticed to the mission station with gifts of 
beads, cloth, salt, or even money. Moreover, students were ecnomic assets 
to their families who considered it only just to be compensated for the 
loss of their children's labor. 
In time, these external sources of opposition to missions diminished 
in importance. As the position of government chiefs was increasingly 
challenged by the rise of a younger, educated. and politically conscious 
element, many chiefs began to view missionaries as "useful allies in 
combating a breakdown in their own authority." 3 Furthermore, popular 
hostility to missions was tempered as the economic and social rewards 
of mission education were perceived. At the same time, internal conflicts 
within the mission community were growing more intense. The most dramatic 
expression of this antagonism was the female circumcision controveisy 
of 1929 in which mission attempts to abolish the Kikuyu practice of 
clitoridectomy sparked the formation of many independent schools and churches. 
1 J . . A. Wray, Kenya, Our Newest Colony (London, n.d.), p. 26. 
2 E. May Crawford, By the Equator's Snowy Peaks (London, 1913), p. 128. 
3 CMS, Accession 85, Hooper typescript. 
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It is important to realize, however, that this crisis only revealed 
and perhaps intensified, but did not create, European-African conflict 
within the mission community. The history of the CMS suggests, in 
fact, that such internal conflicts were present from the very be-
ginning of the mission's work in Kenya. 
The source of these internal conflicts must be souqht most 
fundamentally in the structure of the CMS community in which an 
unequal distribution of power produced an objective incompatibility 
of interests. It is necessary to stress this point in order to avoid 
the impression that such tensions were merely the result of cross-
1 
cultural misunderstanding. While the "clash of cultures" is certainly 
an important element in any explanation of the nature of conflict in 
the CMS community, it can be best understood in the political context 
of the mission community as well as in that of the larger colonial 
society. 
Throughout the period under consideration here, African pastors, 
teachers, converts and students ·protested their subordination and 
powerlessness within the mission community. Such dissatisfaction was 
evident in the earliest of the CMS communities, the freed slave settle-
ments at Freretown and Rabai. Intimately associated with the founding 
of these communities was a group of men known as "Bombay Africans." These 
were ex-slaves who had been liberated earlier in the century and had 
been settled and educated by the CMS near Bombay. When Freretown and 
1 For a view muth along these lines, see T. Price, 11 The Missionary Struggle 
with Complexity," Christianity in Tropical Africa, ed. C.G. Baeta (London, 
1968), pp. 106-08. 
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Rabai were established as freed slave settlements in 1875, the CMS 
imported some 150 of these "Bombay Africans" to assist in the work. 
Acting as catechists, interpreters, preachers, teachers and artisans, 
they were in large measure responsible for the successful establishment 
of the settlements. Yet their own position was ambiguous. On the one 
hand, missionaries regarded them primarily as model citizens of the 
settlements, living affirmations of the beneficent results of mission 
work and the designated model for the newly freed slaves. On the 
other hand, they considered themselves as co-laborers with the European 
missionaries and felt that they had a claim on European recognition 
and gratitude. Based on a premise of equality with the missionaries, 
such expectations issued in a kind of racial condescension and stereo-
typing that was becoming increasingly characteristic of European thought 
about Africans in general and educated Africans in particular. 
By 1881, an incipient rebellion of at least the better educated 
Bombay Africans was in full swing. In a long memorandum they appealed 
over the heads of local missionaries to the Parent Committee in London. 1 
After pointing out in detail the work undertaken by themselves, they 
summarized: 
In short, the work which has already been done here 
and what · is being done now by the Europeans are done 
thro [sic] the Bombay Africans. For all this why 
should the missionaries be ever murmuring against 
the Bombay Africans? 
The writers of the memorandum proposed that they be either stationed in 
a different location under a God-fearing missionary or that they be 
completely removed from the mission. Finally, they stated their refusal 
to receive communion from the missionaries until their letter was 
answered. 
1CMS/1881/30, Memorandum of Bombay Africans to CMS, February 28, 1881. 
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This memorandum illustrated the nature of their central demand; 
if not equality, at least recognition as the valued associates of the 
missionaries. While they wanted to work within the mission system, 
they had felt themselves driven almost to the point of rupture. The 
protest of the Bombay Africans brought a quick response from the mission. 
A senior official was dispatched to investigate the situation and cer-
tain changes in personnel and policy were made. Yet the problem of 
the relationship between the missionaries and their African employees 
persisted largely because the structure of the mission community and 
the attitudes of European missionaries were not fundamentally altered. 
The -Bombay Africans were not alone in expressing their feelings 
of deprivation. The newly freed slaves, who made up the great majority 
of the settlements' population, protested their lack of economic 
security in a variety of ways. As early as 1876, some 160 out of 180 
members of a class for baptismal candidates boycotted the class in 
protest against some of their number having had part of their pay with-
1 held by the CMS due to absence from work. In the mid-1880s when famine 
and poor soil combined to render their means of livelihood extremely 
vulnerable, they organized to demand that the mission itself provide 
them with work. 2 And after the arrival of the British East Africa 
Company in 1888, a large number of freed slaves deserted the settlements, 
finding employment with the Company a more secure alternative to the pre-
carious existence they led in the mission. 3 
1
cMS/M4/1876/104, Lamb to Wright, October 9, 1876. 
2 
CMS/1884/115, Shaw to Lang, November 22, 1884. 
3w.s. Price, My Third Campaign in East Africa (London, 1890), pp. 152, 169, 183 
CMS/1889/283, Smith to Lang, September 25, 1889. 
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Neither the Bombay Africans nor the freed slaves had any mission 
sanctioned channels through which to express their grievances, for prior 
to 1900 there were no institutional structures whaiever through which 
they could contribute to the formation of mission policy. Discontent 
with this situation led to the creation during the 1890's of an African 
Workers Council, a body designed to unite all the educated African 
employees of the mission and to express their views on matters concerning 
the development of the church. The mission was suspicious of such an 
independent body, fearing that it "threatens to menace the authority of 
the mission. 111 It was in part the aggressive activities of this Council 
that after 1900 led the mission to create certain institutions of church 
government such as Bishop's Locai Councils to deal with matters of 
discipline in individual congregations -- and, more impbrtantly, an 
African Church Council (Ace); theoretically the beginning of an African 
church organization independent of the mission. 
Though these institutions gave the appearance of African participa-
tion in the ecclesiastical affairs of the mission community, the real_ity 
was far from a genuine sharing of power and was perceived as such by 
many Africans· invol·ved in these bodies. dnly six months after the 
establishment of the Bishop's Local Council at Rabai, for example, its 
members threatened to resign as a group unless they were granted greater 
powers. 2 A similar situation was apparent in the African Church 'council. 
1cMS/1901/ll8, Burt to Baylis, June 13, 1901; 1901/153, African Workers 
Council, n.d. 
2 KNA: CMS/1/634, Rabai Logbook, February 6, August 14, 1900. 
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"The system works best," instructed the CMS Parent Committee in 1910, 
"when the Church Council is always led to realize that it is a sub-
ordinate body'' reporting to the mission until the establishment of 
diocesan authority. 1 Such policies were in large measure responsible 
for a persistent shortage of both clergy' and lay agents in the mission. 
By the outbreak of World War I, some forty years after the founding 
of Freretown, only three ordained Africans were at work in the mission 
and it was openly admitted that young men were decidedly reluctant to · 
come forward for ordination. 
While the .pace of ordinations picked up after 1920, particularly 
in Kikuyuland, the problem of power remained unsolved. Perhaps the 
best illustration of the conflicts engendered in this way involves 
Bishop Heywood's attempt to create an Anglican ecclesiastical province 
in East Africa which would have established the Church's autonomy of 
Canterbury. African opposition to this proposal, which played an 
important and successful role in preventing its realization, was based 
on two related fears: first, that self-government in the church would 
mean oermanent white domination in the church since "we have no Bishops 
and Archdeacons of our own co 1 our in East Africa. "2 Second, they feared 
that ecclesiastical self-government .would encourage political self-
qovernment which would likewise be controlled by whites. These fears 
were articuiated in an appeal to the Parent Committee in 1937: 
1cMS/Ll0, Baylis to Rogers, October 6, 1910. 
2 P. Mbatea to CMS, September, 1937, in CMS, Accession 85, Hooper typescript, 
PO. 26-27. 
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In the Kenya Legislative Council we Africans are 
represented by Europeans, but, although they are 
very desirous to help, unfortunately they do not 
understand us well. It then becomes evident that 
if the Ecclesiastical Province takes place so 
early, we Africans will have to be represented in 
important meetings of the Church by Europeans who
do not understand us. 1
Africans, therefore, preferred to delay formal ecclesiastical 
independence until they were in a position to control the church, and 
in a variety of ways they sought to increase the degree of African 
oower in mission and church affairs. Thus, in 1934 the African Church 
Council asked for permission to nominate all candidates for Divinity 
. 
School training and requested that certain of the larger mission schools 
be placed under African Boards of Managers. 2 They also insisted on 
greater authority in financial matters. 3 Local congregations as well 
. as . the ACC sought to .maintain control over their own affairs. Thus, 
when the CMS arbitrarily removed two well-liked African agents who 
were serving the Mombasa congregation, a "very antagonistic" attitude 
was provoked among the church members and the formation of an independent 
church was averted only by CMS concessions on the issue. 4 
The fundamental cause of African protest within the mission com-
munity was the sense of deprivation among Africans arising from European 
domination of that community. Consider the reaction of the African Church 
1
!bid. 
' Ibid
2KNA: CMS/1/103, Minutes of Central Council of the ACC, July 30-Aug. 2, 1934. 
3 P. Mbatea to CMS, September, 1937, in CMS, Accession 85, Hooper typescript, p. 27. 
4 KNA: CMS/1/599, Hillard to Bishop, Sept. 25, 1933; Hillard to Bishop, Oct. 2, 
1933; Hillard to Pitt-Pitts, Oct. 13, 1933; Pitt-Pitts to Hillard, Oct. 16, 1933. 
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Council when they discovered that no Africans were included on a 
mission committee charged with changing Kikuyu orthography; 
... may we request that in future when matters 
concerned with African peoples comecbefore you, 
you consent of your great goodness first of all 
to consult with the people concerned in this matter. 1 
Very few missionaries perceived the problem of their relations with 
Africans in this light. One of those who did was W. E. Owen, CMS 
missionary in western Kenya, who succinctly surrmarized the roots 
of conflict in the mission community: 
Essentially the African in Kenya desires, passionately, 
to be free to manage his own church affairs without 
what he thinks is undue interference. He is dragooned 
in civil life by alien laws which he is not allowed a 
voice in forming. He wants to keep that dominance out of the church.
While oower disoarity remained at the heart of internal mission-
African conflict, particular issues changed over time. One persistent 
area of tension lay in what Africans regarded as mission attempts to 
limit their aspirations for social and economic improvement. African 
rejection of these lim1tations led to a prolonged crisis in the mission 
at Freretown between 1897 and 1902, characterized by mass resignations 
of mission employees and a strike in the Divinity School. Behind these 
expressions of ·protest lay a whole series of grievances by frustrated 
African "improvers. 11 In the first place, missionaries were unwilling 
to permit Africans personal freedom in matters of dress, a reluctance 
which served to maintain the existing distribution of status within 
1 KNA: CMS/l/103, Samuel Nguru to Secretary, Kenya Missionary Council, n.d. 
2 KNA: CMS/l/104, Owen to Smith, February 4, 1938. 
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the settlement. Teachers were therefore forbidden from wearing 
trousers and were required instead to wear the kanzu, a garment which 
they detested for its association with Arab or Swahili slave traders. 1 
Mission employees were likewise discouraged from building their own 
houses or cultivating land to supplement their meager mission salaries. 2 
Mission wages were consistently very low relative to prevailing rates 
in secular employment, a fact which played an important role in the 
resignations of 1897-99. 3 A final grievance lay in mission unwilling-
ness to offer instruction in English, believing that it contributed to 
the 11 detribalization 11 of Africans. As late a:s 1919, one missionary 
could write that "the teaching of English broadcast would, more than 
anything else I know of, harm the spiritual life of the African church. 114 
Since Africans viewed English as "necessary, nay essential, to one's 
future welfare in this Protectorate, 11 they regarded mission reluctance 
in this area as having "precluded any idea of our children's advance-
ment.115 The strike in the CMS Divinity School in 1900 was sparked by
the refusal of the principal to teach English or even to address his 
students in that language. 6 
1
cMS/1891/89, Binns to Lang, Feb. 28, 1891; 1900/119, Peel to Baylis, 
Aug. 20, 1900; KNA: CMS/1/634, Rabai Log Book, Feb. 7, 1895; Alfred R. 
Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa. (London, 1908), I, p. 357. 
2cMS/1895/102, Tucker to Baylis, March 4, 1895. 
3
cMS/l 898/l 84, Minutes of Finance Cammi ttee, Nov. 1 , 1898; 1899/112, Jones to 
Baylis, May 9, 1899; 1898/96, Semler to Binns, May 2, 14, 1898; 1898/96, 
Deiml Deimlerto Finance Cammi ttee, Apri 1 9, 1898. 
4 . CMS/1919/92, Burns to Britton, Nov. 26, 1919. Other reasons for his 
opposition to English teaching included 11 the danger in which such a course 
would place white women and girls" as well as 11 the danger of organizing 
against the government and Europeans.'' 
5Jones to Education Commission in British East Africa Protectorate, Evidence of 
the Education Commission (Nairobi, 1919). 
6 CMS/1902/39, Peel to Baylis, January 25, 1902. 
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During the post-World War I period, it was primarily the inadequacy 
of mission education both in terms of quantity and quality that provoked 
the protest of African improvers. This idea was clearly expressed by 
the African Christian Educational Society, an organization which repre-
sented African adherents of the CMS and Methodist mission on the coast, 
in a statement to the Education Commission of 1919. The Society argued 
that existing schools were: 
quite inadequate to train pupils up to anything approaching 
a decent standard to start life either in government or 
commercial firms and that the present standard is required 
to be raised and fully trained teaching staff provided to 
cope with any improvements that may be instituted. 
They concluded by advocating a system of industrial education, as well 
as a "miniature sort of University for the coast. " 1
Mission schools were regarded not only as educationally inadequate 
but politically suspect as well. Harry Thuku, earliest of the modern 
nationalists, was reluctant to trust even the best intentioned whites 
with the education of his people. He therefore appealed to Tuskeegee 
Institute for "our own man, a skinsman brother" to establish a 11 Tuskeegee 
in the African wilds_. 112 Some years later a perceptive CMS , missionary, 
Handley Hooper, explained the growing African dissatisfaction with 
mission schools by observing that 
... it is the desire to control their own destinies 
which makes them anxious to have an educational system 
which they imagine will be directed largely according to 
their own predilections. 
1Noah Manasseh to Education Commission, in British East Africa Protectorate, 
Evidence of Education Commission (Nairobi, 1919). 
2Thuku to Secretary, Tuskeegee Institute, Sept. 8, 1921, in K. J. King,"The . 
American Background to the Phelps-Stokes Commissions ... ," Ph.D. D1ssertat1on 
Edinburgh University, 1968, Appendix V. Edinburgh House Archives, Box 242, Hooper to Oldham, April 11, 1929. 
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If "protests of improvement" demonstrate African desire for free 
access to a wider range of modern educational and economic opportuni-
ties than missionaries were willing to grant, protests of preservation 
or restoration represent an African defense of their traditional 
cultures in the face of mission attacks. 
Africans within 
the mission community as well as those outside it came to resent 
mission insistence on their discarding certain basic features of their 
customary ways of life. The persistently high turnover rate among 
mission employees, many of whom were dismissed for consulting diviners 
or taking a second wife, represented a continuing affirmation of the 
strength of indigenous culture. Moreover, during the 1920's, the theme 
of cultural integrity became an important element in Kikuyu nationalist 
ideology -- a body of ideas formulated and articulated largely by 
mission adherents. The pages of the Kikuyu journal Muigwithania were 
full of exhortations to adhere to or recover a variety of Kikuyu customs. 
Consider the fo 11 owing examp 1 e. 11 Un 1 ess you ho 1 d onto the Kikuyu 
characteristics at this time, you will become like a little appendage 
on a goat, which is neither part of the meat nor of the skin. 111 Mission 
attacks on the vitally important custom of female circumcision in 1929 
thus met with determined resistance both within and outside the mission 
and resulted in many places in a permanent rupture of the mission com-
munity. 
1Muigwithania, May, 1929. 
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A final expression of internal opposition to the CMS was political 
in nature, involving the identification of the CMS with the colonial 
state. In certain respects, this identification had served to attract 
Africans to the mission, -and missionaries had come to regard themselves 
as spokesmen for African interests before the colonial government. 
They were officially recognized as such in 1924. But when, during the 
1920's, the focus of African opposition to British rule came to center 
on educated mission adherents, missionaries found themselves unable to 
speak for their own followers, let alone for African interests generally. 
Harry Thuku was both cri ti ca 1 and suspicious of missionaries and is saidd 
1 
to have suggested that they were in the pay of settlers. By the end 
of the decade, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the lineal 
descendant of Thuku's abortive movement, forthrightly declared: "No 
European can really and truly represent us. The only person capable of 
representing us really well is a man with a black skin. 112 And in the 
early 1930's this distrust of missionary spokesmen, particularly re-
garding the land question, had penetrated even to the staunch mission 
adherents in moderate parties such as the Kikuyu Loyal Patriots and the 
Progressive Kikuyu Party. Together with the KCA, they made clear their 
opposition to being represented by missionaries: 
... we do not want a self-Government to be born 
in Kenya because we have no representatives to speak 
1Edinburgh House Archives, Box 263, Hooper to Oldham, March 4, 1922. 
2Muigwithania, February-March, 1929. 
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for us in the . Legislative Council [in] whom 
we can fully confide. Those who are con-
sidered our pleaders do not help us or speak 
for us as they ought.1 
Such repudiation of missionary spokesmen (and at the same time of 
government appointed chiefs) reflected the rise of a new group of 
alternative "communicators, 112 the mission-educated elite, who felt that 
they could speak for their people with greater authority and sympathy 
than either missionaries or chiefs. There were, in fact, solid reasons 
for their regarding missionaries as "pleaders ... [who] do not help us." 
In the first place, missionaries had been closely associated with the 
government's bitterly resented policy of land alienation. Harry Leakey, 
CMS missionary at Kabete, complained that the government had twice used 
him to assure the people around his station that no more of their 1 and 
would be taken, only to prove him a liar on both occasions. 3 Furthermore, 
missionaries had been actively involved in the attempt to suppress 
African political activity. McGregor, for example, had helped to collect 
sworn affidavits to justify the government in ordering Thuku's arrest. 4 
1Presbyterian Church of East Africa, file marked "Political" 1933-, Koinange 
Mbiu and J. Kamau to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Octover 13, 1934. 
2 J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," Journal of 
African History, IX (1968), pp. 119-146. Lonsdale sees the chiefs as the 
old communicators of social needs and political ideas whose role was in-
creasingly usurped by missionar,v-educated elites I am arguing that 
missionaries had performed similar functions and were being similarly 
challenged. 
3CMS/191 l /11 O, Leakey to Baylis, October 6, 1911. 
4 KNA: CMS/1/625, Weithaga Logbook, April, 1922. 
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John Comely in Embu found himself "led by prayer 11 to rule that no 
l 
member of the KCA could serve as a church elder. Others attempted 
to assert mission influence, if not control, over emerging political 
movements by encouraging the formation of rival mission-sponsored 
associations.2 Such actions, and the paternalist assumptions on which 
they were based, were largely responsible for this dimension of the 
internal opposition to missions. 
This consideration of anti-mission protests points to several 
cone 1 us ions. Fi rs t, while the roots of African prates t were many and 
varied, almost all were conditioned by virtue of occurring within a 
colonial situation and were therefore to some extent politicized. 
Certain expressions of anti-mission sentiment were directly related 
to the political subordination of African communities. The Mazrui . 
rebellion and the Giriama .rising aimed at sweeping away the colonial 
regime and missions along with it. The Thuku movement and the Kikuyu 
Central Association hoped to ameliorate certain aspects of colonial 
rule through militant political organization and protest, but found 
missions frequently opposed to their tactics and sometimes hand in 
glove with the .government. The anti-missionary attitudes of some 
chiefs were no less political in origin though they derived from a 
fear that the existence of mission communities headed by Europeans 
undermined their own authority. 
1 KNA: CMS/1/637, Embu Logbook, September 1, 1928; July 5, 1929. 
2Edinburgh House Archives, Box 236, H. D. Hooper: 11 Development of 
Political Self-Consciousness in the Kikuyu Native;" KNA: CMS/1/639, 
Kabare Logbook, April 4, 9, 1929. 
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Other expressions of protest were less directly political in 
nature. Protests of improvement and those of cultural preservation 
were not on the surface of political import. Yet in a colonial situa-
tion such concerns frequently assumed political overtones. In the 
late 1920 1 s, Joma Kenyatta, - then editor of Muigwithania, observed that 
knowledge was the key to 11 rulership 11 in the modern world. 1 Many others 
echoed his belief and feared that mission education was designed to 
perpetuate African political as well as economic subordination. 
Cultural issues likewise took on political significance as illustrated 
in the female circumcision controversy of 1929. The emotion generated 
by this issue was effectively channeled into popular political protest 
by the Ki.kuyu Central Association. In a colonial situation, then, such 
issues: 
take on the function of signs that are being consciously 
utilized to express resistance to a foreign order and to 
foreign values as well as to pledge fidelity to their own 
system of values.2 
A final way in which anti-mission protests were political in character 
lay in African rejection of their subordinate role within the mission 
itself. However, this internal political struggle within. the CMS 
community paralleled and interpenetrated political events in the larger 
society. In the first place, the establishment of British rule certainly 
strengthened the position of missionaries relative to Africans within 
the CMS community. For example, the Bombay African pastor, William Jones, 
1 Mui gwi thani a, December, 1928-January, 1929; Apri 1 , 1929. 
2Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians (Boston, 1962), p. 156. 
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who had been in charge of the secular as well as religious affairs 
of Rabai, was abruptly relieved of much of his authority upon the creation 
of the British East Africa Protectorate in 1895 only to be replaced by 
a European missionary, A. G. Smith. It was Jones' very understandable 
resentment of such treatment that sparked the 1897 crisis on the coast. 
The connection which Africans later made between mission-sponsored eccle-
siastical independence and settler-sponsored political self-government, 
both of which were rejected on the grounds that they would lead to 
permanent white domination, further illustrates the links between in-
ternal mission struggles and the politics of a colonial society. 
A second major conclusion concerns not the roots or expression 
of anti-mission protest, but rather its consequences. If the colonial 
situation influenced the nature of such protests, did this African 
opposition have any impact on mission policy or on the development of 
mission institutions? While the ability of Africans generally to 
significantly influence events in colonial societies was relatively 
circumscribed, there were a number of areas in which they 11 retained 
some control over their own destinies. 111 The mission community was 
one of these, and in a variety of ways African protests helped to shape 
the development of the CMS community. 
In the first place, the timing of mission expansion and the location 
of mission stations was not a matter which Europeans decided on their 
own. The hostility of the coastal Arab community largely prevented the 
1J.F.A. Ajayi, 11 Colonialism: An Episode in Africah History, 11 Colonialism in 
Africa, 1870-1960, ed. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan (London, 1969), I, 508. 
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CMS from establishing itself among the Giriama until the coming of 
the Imperial British East Africa Company neutralized this source of 
opposition. On the other hand, the encouragement of men such as 
Karuri facilitated the founding of mission centers in central Kikuyu-
land and elsewhere. 
Beyond this, mission policies on a variety of issues were in-
fluenced by African protests. A s i gni fi cant rise in wages for mission 
employees grew directly out of the 1897-1899 crisis at Freretown. 
Persistent African demands for more instruction in English were a 
constant constraint on mission curricular planning. 1 Finally, the 
CMS policy on the circumcision question became progressively more moderate 
during the course of the controversy, for missionaries correctly feared 
that to do otherwise would result in the permanent rupture of the mission 
community. 
African pressures also influenced the development of certain 
mission institutions. The establishment of a mission controlled African 
Church Council was clearly related to the prior formation of an active,-
aggressive and independent African Workers Council. Conversely, African 
opposition to the creation of an ecclesiastical province was a major 
element in the failure of this scheme. 
Lastly, African protest against missions conditioned the develop-
ment of the CMS community by altering in certain respects the larger 
environment within which the missionary enterprise was pursued. Thus, 
African dissatisfaction with mission education and corresponding African 
1 See, for example, KNA: CMS/1/288, Beecher to Smith, August 4, 1936. 
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insistence on government schools were important factors in persuading 
the government to play a more active role in educational matters. 
By 1929, it was admitted that African demands were becoming the 
11 d . . . h . 1om1nat1ng factor 1n t e s1tuat1on. The need for the administration 
to respond positively to these demands substantially undercut the 
ability of missions to take initiatives in educational affairs and 
was responsible for the defensive character of their relationship with 
the government throughout the 1920 1 s and later. Furthermore, intense 
African opposition to mission attempts to abolish the Kikuyu practice 
of clitoridectomy made the government exceedingly reluctant to support 
the missions on this issue. 2 This politically inspired reluctance was 
a necessary condition for a relatively successful African defiance of 
missions and for the establishment of independent schools and churches. 
In many respects, Professor Iliffe's recent analysis of the role 
of African initiative in colonial societies is particularly relevant to 
mission communities. 
African response can no longer be described in the 
negative terms of resistance. Attempts to initiate, 
accelerate and control change become at least equally 
important. Second, and following from this, colonial rule 
cannot be seen as a process of European initiative and 
African response. Instead, a very complex pattern emerges, 
a pattern of local initiatives and local bargains, an inter-
play between European and African aims ... 
1Education Department, Annual Report, 1929, p. 8. 
211 Legislation to prevent this practice would be most difficult to enforce 
and premature action might have the effect of uniting native authorities 
against the government in defense of old customs.'' KNA: DC/EBU/8/2, 
Watkins to All Senior Commissioners, September 21, 1925. 
3John Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912, (Nairobi, 1969), p. 6-7 
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Thus, European missionaries were perhaps as often responding to 
African pressures as they were implementing their own preconceived 
ideas and plans. Conversely, the African response to missions, 
both that of "collaboration" and of protest, was neither passive 
nor simply reactive, but consisted in a rational pursuit of 
particular goals within the confines of externally imposed conditions. 
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THE NYANGIRE REBELLION OF 1907: 
ANTI-COLONIAL PROTEST AND THE NATIONALIST MYTH 
Edward I. Steinhart 
The past two decades have seen the rise and triumph of African 
nationalism in virtually the whole of the African continent north of 
the Zambesi River. Paralleling this has been the triumph of African 
nationalist historiography. Starting in the early 1960's, an inter-
pretation of the history of modern Africa, which sees nationalism as 
a deeply-rooted and powerful force, became a major 11 school 11 of 
historical writing about Africa. This "school" has concentrated on 
explaining the social and political changes which transformed African 
societies during the colonial era, placing heavy emphasis on the con-
tinuity of certain pre-colonial African forms and on the role of African 
initiative in the transformation. The culmination of this transformation 
was the rush to African independence in the 1950 1s and 1960ts led by 
professedly nationalist parties and movements. This climactic era 
provides the point from which earlier events have been viewed and inter-
preted by the "nationalist school." 
However, after the first flush of nationalist triumph, there has 
been a period of stock-taking. 1 Africa south of the Zambesi remains 
white-ruled despite nationalist wars of liberation and speeches of 
denunciation. Independent African states have often fallen prey to the 
hawks of civil war, military coup and economic and social stagnation. 
Is African nationalism proving a weak reed because its roots do not 
penetrate so very far into the past? If nationalism is not the forceful 
creature we saw struggling to emerge in the 1950's, perhaps our inter-
pretations of the roots of nationalism in African history need to be 
1see I. Wallerstein's personal stock-taking in "Looking Back at African 
Independence Ten Years Later, 11 Africa Today, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1971), pp. 2-5. 
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re-examined, to say nothing of our interpretation of the nature and 
strength of nationalism in contemporary Africa. 
This is especially true of the history of early African resistance 
and protest movements, which have been a special concern of the 11 nationalist 
school. 11 The failure of the nationalist interpretation in the post-
independence era threatens to leave an interpretative void in the growing 
scholarship on protest. In the following essay, I hope to examine some 
of the failings of the nationalist interpretation of protest, first by 
examining the views of the school and second by a case study in anti-
colonial protest: The Nyangire Rebellion of 1907 in Bunyoro, Uganda. 
From these I will attempt to suggest a new hypothesis on the nature of 
protest in colonial Africa to fill the threatened void. 
* * * 
The announcement of the theme of resistance and protest as a major 
concern of African historians1 came as no surprise and found an immediate 
audience and warm response among scholars and the general public. 1970 in 
a sense saw the high water mark of the protest theme with the publication 
of a massive tome of protest studies edited by Dr. Mazrui and Dr. Rotberg. 2 
This volume of diverse studies has ·collected both the nationalist and 
what we might call para-nationalist points of view in a collection which 
as Mazrui has suggested will be a "primary source of thought and illumina-
3 tion on protest as a social fact in Africa ... 11 · for some time to come. 
111 Introduction 11 to Erner in Themes in African Histor, edited by T.O. Ranger 
(Nairobi, East African Pub 1sh1ng House, 1968, xv11-xviii. 
2R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1970). 
3 Ibid., p. 1195. 
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Nonetheless, even in this recent statement of the literature of protest, 
we can discern some discomfort with details of the interpretative 
apparatus of the 11 nationalist school." But, such criticisms as Mazrui 
and Rotberg raise are indirect and tangential, leaving the body of nation-
alist thought intact. 1 
A direct challenge to the nationalist literature of protest has 
been aimed at the so-called "Dar es Salaam s·chool" by two South African 
scholars, Dr. Donald Denoon and Dr. Adam Kuper. These authors have very 
forcefully argued against what they believe to be 11 ideological history," 
which 11 has adopted the political philosophy of current African nationalism, 
and has used it to inform the study of African history. 11 2 While I believe 
their criticism is well aimed, it leaves us asking how distorted is our 
view of Afri tan protest and what kind of corrective 1 ens, can we apply? 
The attack on the 11 Dar es Salaam school 11 has been aimed at 
several representatives of that school in a rather ad hominem fashion. The 
targets included those who have worked on subjects other than anti-colonial 
protest, such as archaeology and pre-colonial history. 3 In contrast, I 
will concentrate on making the argument that a major failing of the "nation-
alist school'' has been its misinterpretation of anti-colonial manifestations 
as nationalist or proto-nationalist in sentiment, while disregarding or 
deflating other sources of anti-colonial feeling and ideology. 
1 Cf, my review in Ufahamu I I, l , 
2o. Denoonand A. Kuper, "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation, 11 
African Affairs Vol. 69, No. 277 (1970), pp. 329-349. 
3 Cf. the attack on A. D. Roberts, ed., Tanzania Before 1900 (Nairobi, East 
African Publishing House, 1968) and on A. Temu and I. Kimambo, eds., A 
History of Tanzania (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1969). Cf. 
M. Chanock, 11 Development and Change in the History of Malawi, 11 Conference 
on the Early History of Malawi, Limbe, 1970, for a general critique of 
nationalist historiography in Malawi. 
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What is the view of the "nationalist school" on African protest 
movements? The first point to be made is that the nationalist historians 
insist upon a continuity of early protest through the colonial period, 
a continuity which connects early protest forms with later forms of agi-
1 
tation that we generally accept as mass nationalism. Thus, the roots 
of nationalism are placed far in the past, at least coincidental with the 
first expressions of protest against colonial overrule. The emphasis is 
on the deepness of the roots of African nations and the growth of popular 
participation in movements of protest, which culminated in the organization 
and success of nationalist parties and movements. 2 Anti-colonial protest 
is thus equated with nascent feelings of nationhood and the creation of 
institutions of national scale and identification. It is this "myth of 
nationalism" which has come under attack by both politicians and scholars, 
who have upheld the ultimate utility of objective scholarship. 3 While 
objective scholarship is readily applauded, it is not in itself a sub-
stitute for an interpretation of the nature of protest which can accommodate 
the diverse empirical data without theoretical banality. 
1 T. 0. Ranger, "Connexions between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern 
Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," Journal of African History, 
IX, 3 and 4 (1968), pp. 437-53, 631-41. 
2 J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," Journal of 
African History IX, l (1968), pp. 119-46; "The Emergence of African Nations," 
in Emerging Themes, T. 0. Ranger, ed., pp. 201-17. 
3 Cf. Denoon and Kuper, "Nationalist Historians," pp. 346-48. 
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There are two basic pitfalls of the nationalist interpretation of 
protest. One has already been anticipated by Dr. Ranger when he briefly 
recognized that "African resistance, in the sense of movements similar 
to those categorized as 'primary resistance' movements, has taken the form 
of protest against dominance or sub-imperialism, by other African peoples. 111 
Moreover, Ranger also notes that 11 traditions of resistance can sometimes 
be used against nationalist movements as well as _QY them. 11 However, 
this somewhat embarrassing fact is dismissed in a call for further in-
vestigation of "the whole question of African resistance to African 
pressures. 112 The whole question not only deserves investigation, but 
it may well require that we rethink the problem of resistance and protest 
and its implications for later social and political movements. If protest 
and "primary resistance 11 can and are directed against not only aliens who 
have come to dominate, but even against 11 domestic 11 forms of oppression, then 
perhaps protest must be viewed as something other than the expression of 
3 
national aspirations for "self-government and self-expression as groups. 11 
To interpret protest as proto-nationalism when it is recognized to include 
protest against non-aliens for reasons which are generated independently 
of- -or in hostility to--ideals of national solidarity may be an exercise 
in wishful hindsight and historically unjustifiable. In the case of Nyangire, 
incipient Ugandan nationalism seems to me to have played no part in sparking 
organized opposition to colonial power. 4 Moreover, while the sub-nationalism 
(particularism) of Bunyoro was a potent force, the motive force and cause of 
protest feelings is something more subtle still. 
l Ranger, 11 Connexions, I I , 11 p. 639. 
2 Ibid., p. 638 
3Rotberg and Mazrui, Protest, xvii. 
4
contrast the hyper-nationalism of G.N. Uzoigwe, 11 The Kyanyangire, 1907, 11 
University of East Africa Social Science Council Conference, Nairobi, 1969, pp.129-
70. Uzoigwe explicitly cites the inspiration of Ranger for his own interpretation, 
p. 162. 
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There is yet a second pitfall of the "Dar es Salaam school: 11 a 
tendency to ignore or misrepresent responses to colonial intrusion which do 
not conform to the themes of resistance and protest. It has been suggested 
that the nationalist historians, in their enthusiasm: for "the genuine 
importance and formidable energy 111 of the nationalist movements, have 
tended to ignore the phenomena of collaboration with the establishment of 
2 
colonial overrule. 
The contention that nationalist historiography ignores primary col-
laboration, i.e., collaboration with the establishment of colonial regimes 
by members of African societies under the pressures of imperial invasion, 
must be somewhat refined. It is, I believe, largely true that the "Dar es 
Salaam school'' has systematically avoided considering the role of African 
collaboration in the establishment of colonial rule in East and Central 
Africa. This,it might be contended stems from their legitimate concentra-
tion on the important movements of resistance and rebellion which have 
taken place, particularly the Maji-Maji uprising studied by Dr. Iliffe and 
Dr. Gwassa and the Shona-Ndebele revolt studied by Dr. Ranger. 3 Yet, even 
' 1 
Ranger, ed., Emerging Themes, xxi. 
2 E. Steinhart, "Primary Collaboration in Ankole, 11 University of East Africa 
Social Science Council Conference, 1968-69, Hi story Papers (Kampala, 
Makerere Institute of Social Research, n.d.), pp. 191-97. 
3 J. Iliffe, Tan an ika under German Rule 1905-1912 (Cambridge, University 
Press, 1969; J. Iliffe and G. Gwassa, Records of the Maji-Maji U risin , 
Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4 Nairobi, East African Pub-
lishing House, 1968); J. Iliffe, "The Organization of the Maji-Maji Rebellion," 
Journal of African History VI I I , 3 ( 1957) , pp. 495-512; G. Gwassa, 11 The 
German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania," in A. Temu and I. 
Kimambo, History of Tanzania (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969); 
T. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897 (London, Heinemann, 1967). 
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the treatment of defection and submission as aspects of these rebellions 
seems to have been minimized. Moreover, except for A. D. Roberts' early 
and singular article on Ganda sub-imperialism in Uganda,1 and despite 
Ranger's call for the investigation of "African resistance to African 
pressure,'' there have been rio studies of collaboration or the African 
_opposition to collaboration by affiliates of the "Dar school." 
But, the major reason that collaboration has appeared as an · ignored 
or submerged theme among the nationalist historians has been a tendency to 
avoid the use of collaboration as a descriptive term and to completely 
eschew the term collaborators for characterizing Africans engaged in 
cooperative action with the colonial regimes. The highly colored and 
politiial origins of that term in the European context of non-resistance 
to Fascism can be used to justify this systematic avoidance. But, the 
complementary tendency to describe collaboration in the African context as 
accommodation or even modernization and to describe the African actors as 
modernizers or communicators has served to distort the nature of the 
response of collaboration by using terms loaded in an opposite direction. 
Instead of the condemnatory term of collaboration with its overtones of moral 
corruption and political self-seeking, we are confronted with essentially 
laudatory terms which emphasize (not coincidentally) the contribution of the 
collaborators to developing the conditions for the emergence of "nationalist 
movements." Dr. Lonsdale's communicators are explicitly the precursors of the 
later colonial communicators, the "nationalist elite. 112 And the modernizers 
1 A. Roberts, "The Sub-Imperialism of Buganda, 11 Journal of African Hi story II I 
3 (1962), pp. 435-50. 
2Lonsdale, "Some Origins," pp. 121 ff. A useful contrast is I. Henderson, "The 
Origins of Nationalism in East and Central Africa: the Zambian Case," Journal 
of African History XI, 4, (1970), pp. 591-603. 
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of the journal, Tarikh, even when they are simultaneously resisters, are 
portrayed as prophets of national independence through selective adapta-
tion.1 Again, "African nationalism 11 and its triumph have cast a long 
shadow back, darkening our understanding of African behavior in both the 
colonial and immediate pre-colonial eras. 
To let some light fall upon the nature of African initiatives and 
responses in the early colonial context, we will have to develop a far 
more subtle understanding of the nature of protest and collaboration than 
is allowed if we accept the nationalist contentions about protest as 
proto-nationalism and collaboration as modernization. But, before we can 
proceed to suggest a framework for such a new understanding of African 
responses, we must attempt to bury the wounded, but still dangerous, 
nationalist hypothesis. In aid of this, we move now to a case study of 
a rebellion which fits few of the nationalist criteria for African re-
sponses and which may provoke some inkling of a subtler ingredient in the 
nature of early colonial protest. 
* * * 
11 The conspiracy had been marked with such able organization and 
recusancy for a long period so quietly and persistently sustained as to 
stamp it with the suspicion of non-native guidance. 112 So wrote the 
British colonial administrator, George Wilson, shortly after the sup-
pression of the Nyangire Rebellion and the arrest of 54 of its African 
1 " Modern i s er s i n A fr i ca , 11 Tari k h I , 4 ( 1 96 7) . 
2Wilson to Elgin, 25 June 1907, E[ntebbe J S[ecretariat] A[rchives] SMP 
710/07. 
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leaders. Wilson's long experience with Nyoro and Uganda politics 
makes it difficult to dismiss his suspicions of "outside agitators" as 
mere racist and reactionary hallucinations. Yet there is no evidence 
whatsoever to sustain the suspicion that non-Banyoro organized or ·pro-
moted the protest movement against colonial and Baganda overrule. What 
made Wilson suspicious and how in fact was this anti-colonial protest 
movement really generated? 
In February, 1907, various Nyoro chiefs began to plan to evict 
their Ganda co-chiefs from the positions to which they had come in the 
previous half decade. 1 By March, a public refusal of cooperation drove 
the Baganda from the Nyoro villages to the protection of the British 
officials at Hoima, the capital. Confronted with direct orders to allow 
the Baganda chiefs to resettle, the Nyoro chiefs refused pointblank 
to reinstate the Baganda. Nyangire Abaganda, as the manifestation is remem-
bered, means, "I have refused the Baganda. 11 The Nyoro chiefs and their 
followers gathered at the capital and persisted in refusing to allow the 
Baganda to return to their posts. Finally, on May 16, 1907, with police 
reinforcements on hand and prompted by fears for the safety of the Ganda 
chiefs, the decision was taken by Wilson himself to break up the 11 frenzied 11 
demonstrations and arrest those chiefs at the capital. No one was killed 
during the "rebellion," "and violence against property was restricted to the 
outlying areas where the huts of Ganda chiefs were burned. A strictly 
constitutional agitation by means of civil disobedience aimed at the re-
dress of specific grievances had pushed the colonial administration to the 
1For vernacular accounts of the events of the rebellion, see J. Nyakatura, 
Abakama ba Bunyoro-Kitara (Canada, St. Justin's Press, 1947), p. 219 and 
L.A. Katyanku and S. Bulera Obwomezi Bw' Omukama Duhaga II (Kampala, Eagle 
Press, 1950), cyclostyled translation by Andrew Kigere-Kavuma, pp. 18-20. 
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point of counter violence. What were the grievances of the Banyoro 
which underlay the protest? 
Bunvoro, unlike the three other kingdoms of the Uganda Protectorate, 
was a conquered province. No treaty or agreement regulated or formalized 
the relations between the government of Bunyoro and the Protectorate 
Government of British officials. The conquest of Bunyoro was begun in 
1891 when Captain Frederick Lugard, acting for the Imperial British East 
Africa Company and in alliance with the ruling group in the Buganda king-
dom, invaded western Uganda and succeeded in severing Bunyoro's southern-
most counties and establishing a puppet regime in what became the Toro 
kingdom. In 1893 a major military campaign was launched against the Mukama 
Kabarega by the new Protectorate reg·ime in Buganda. Acting in the interest 
of Buganda's security and with a view to gaining control of the Nile 
headwaters, Colonel Colvile, the British commander, succeeded in capturing 
Kabarega's capital and establishing a military occupation. Kabarega was 
eventually driven from his kingdom to exile north of the Nile where he 
organized and led a guerrilla resistance which ended only with the Mukama's 
capture in 1899. 1 It was Uganda's most protracted and heroic resistance 
and a likely subject of nationalist mythology and historical -attention. 
From 1895 a new regime of collaboration was emerging in the rump of the 
Bunyoro kingdom coincident with Kabarega's resistance. The severance of 
Toro in 1891 had been followed by the alienation of large tracts of central 
BunyoroBunyor  to Ganda chiefs as a reward for their participation in Bunyoro's 
1
see E. Steinhart, "Transition in Western Uganda: 1891-1901," unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, pp. 116-73. 
-48-
conquest and in the hopes of settling Buganda's own turbulent religious 
situation. 1 Only the northernmost counties of the old kingdom were left 
to be administered by Nyoro chiefs. A young son of Kabarega's was pro-
claimed Mukama by the British authorities in 1898 in the hope of gaining a 
semblance of legitimacy for the regime of collaboration. With Kabarega's 
capture and exile in 1899 the path lay open for the de facto elaboration 
of a new regime with new personnel under British guidance and protection, 
a regime which de jure was a British creation as the victor claiming the 
spoils. 
The British conviction that the Banyoro were both hostile to progress 
and incapable of efficient government led to the introduction of Baganda 
chiefs as tutors to the regime of collaboration. Everywhere in Uganda 
"progress" in administration and Christian religion was linked to the 
arrival of the agents of Buganda's sub-imperialism. But in Bunyoro it 
took a unique and particularly irritating form. Not only were vast areas 
of Bunyoro territory lying between the two kingdoms simply annexed to 
Buganda in the wake of the conquest, but even within the rump of Nyoro 
territory Baganda chiefs were set over Banyoro chiefs in order to teach 
them the arts of administration, a la Buganda. 
In 1901, upon petition from the Nyoro chiefs charged with running 
the local administration, the Ganda chief, James Miti, was established 
as a chief in Bunyoro. 2 Miti and his following had a profound impact 
on Nyoro government. At first, it would appear that these men, particu-
1 arly Miti, were well received by the Banyoro, or at 1 east by the Nyoro 
1A. D. Roberts, "The 'Lost Counties' of Bunyoro, 11 Uganda Journal xxvi, 2, 
(1962), pp. 194-99. 
2 ' ) P. Lwanga, Obulamu Bw'omutaka J.K. Miti Kabazzi (Kampala, Friends Press, n.d. 
and Wilson to Jackson, 14 Aug. 1901, ESA, Al2/l. Ms. translation by Wm. Mukasa, 
pp. 1-11. 
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political elite. Miti assisted in drafting a new territorial arrangement 
which regularized the chiefly hierarchy and confirmed various Nyoro chiefs 
and sub-chiefs in their titles and positions. This arrangement very much 
resembled the division of responsibility enacted by the formal agreements 
with Bunyoro's lacustrine neighbors, Ankole and Toro, except for the 
absence of landed estates granted to the title holders. Bunyoro, as a 
conquered territory, was not privileged to have chiefly freehold tenure 
introduced at this point. 1 
However, the chiefs had little room for complaint as it was clear that 
they governed at the sufferance of· the colonial authorities. This was even 
true of the Mukama, Kitahimbwa, the son of Kabarega who was enthroned by 
British fiat in 1898. Both Miti and the collaborating chiefs, led by the 
Nyoro chief of Bugahya county, Paulo Byabacwezi, found Kitahimbwe difficult 
to work with in the governing council. In 1902 the chiefs petitioned the 
colonial regime for his removal and were obliged by the appointment of a 
new Mukama, an older son of Kabarega's who became Andereye Duhaga II. 
Miti especially was quick to gain the confidence of the new monarch and 
become effective ruler of the council and the country. This in turn led 
to increasing numbers of Ganda agents entering service in Bunyoro hoping 
by that means to advance their careers as colonial administrators. 2 
1see Steinhart, thesis, pp. 192-208. 
2Tomkins to Commissioner, 16 Oct. · 1902, ESA Al2/2 and Interviews B/34, 
Princess Alexandria Komukyeya, 11 November 1968, and B/3 Martin Mukidi, 
13 October 1968. 
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As early as June, 1902, the district officer noted 11 the very bad feeling 
that exists between the Ynyoro [sic] chiefs, and those who have been brought 
1 
from Uganda and elsewhere, and put in charge of some of the counties." 
While the eruption was still five years away, the roots of the disturbance 
in the fears among the Banyoro that their kingdom would be taken from them by 
piecemeal annexation or expropriation by Baganda chiefs "as was the case in 
Bugangaidzi and Buyaga, 11 the "lost counties," were already evident. 
Moreover, the condition of the peasantry in the 11 lost counties II had even 
in 1902 become the source of real grievance, with Nyoro cultivators attempt-
2 ing to move from under the Ganda chiefs to escape harsh treatment. Thus, 
the basic grievance over the presence of the Ganda chiefs and the treatment 
they gave their Nyoro underlings was present virtually from the onset of 
Ganda sub-imperialism. 
This grievance was intensified by the fears that the Ganda would 
eventually take over full authority in Bunyoro. And the notion was not as 
far fetched as it might appear. As late as December, 1904, the local colonial 
official recommended to his superiors "the employment of carefully selected 
Waganda 11 as chiefs. It was his contention that in matters of the cultivation 
of cash crops in particular that these Baganda· would ''give more favorable 
results than are at present obtained by the apathetic, unreliable and 
1Tomkins ·to Commissioner 16 June 1902, ESA Al2/2. 
2Bagge to Commissioner 16 May 1902, ESA Al2/2 and interview B/10, Metushera 
Katuramu, 21 October 1968. 
1 
untrustworthy Wanyoro 11 
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In this fear it is safe to rec_ogni ze a 
certain community of interest between the Nyoro chiefs and the Nyoro 
cultivators. Thus, while the i narti cul inarticulatebakopi ( common man) was not 
in the forefront of protest, his· opposition to Ganda overrule can be 
seen in the attempted migration from the "lost counties" and in a curious 
crisis which developed in 1904. 
At that time, a new _district officer took it on his own authority 
to cancel the labor services owed to the chiefs by the bakopi as he 
felt it interfered with the bakopi cultivation of their own gardens. There 
was an immediate outcry from among the chiefs, including the Mukama Duhaga. 
Administrative action was necessary, argued the district officer, as the 
"peasantry," who had "become little more than slaves ready to work for the 
chiefs when ordered" feared that their complaints would be cause for further 
prestations when they came before the governing council dominated as it was 
by Miti. Despite the humanitarian impulse and the recognition of the 
legitimacy of some of the bakopi grievances, the labor services were 
quickly restored. 2 It was decided to uphold the "properly constituted 
authority'' of the chiefs. Although the chiefs were lacking in education, 
he said, "the peasantry require discipline in even greater degree. 113 Some 
1Fowler to Wilson, 31 December 1904, ESA Al2/5. 
2 Prendergast to Commissioner, n.d., 10 January 1904 and 8 February 1904, 
ESA-Al2/5. 
3
wilson to Commissioner, 10 March 1904, ESA Al2/5. These events are 
described as a "rebellion" by Katyanku and Bulera, Obwomezi, p. 18. 
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adjustments were suggested such as the keeping of labor rolls by chiefs 
and the right of appeal from the council to the local colonial officer, 
but I think it can be agreed that "peasant" grievances against chiefly 
authority, particularly the authority of the alien chiefs, was a constant 
factor underlying the rebellion of 1907.
At the time of the dispute over labor services, the chiefs had in-
tended to petition the colonial authority for salaries and estates like 
those obtained by the chiefs of Buganda. The dispute over labor presta-
tions temporarily delayed their appeal. 1 However, by 1905 new arrange-
ments on the rights and responsibilities of chiefs were being made and 
were promulgated in 1906 as the System of Chieftaincy in Unyoto, 1906. 2 
While the Nyoro chiefs Seem to have been satisfied with the arrangements 
at the time, they contained the seeds of some discord. First, no private 
estates were allotted under the new system. By this time the Nyoro chiefs 
were well aware of the differences between themselves and the chiefs of 
the neighboring kingdoms, but that did little to soften the resentment. 
By late 1906 the Nyoro chiefs had petitioned unsuccessfully for private 
3 1 ands. 
Secondly, there was a marked increase in the territorial authority of 
both James Miti and Mika Fataki, a Musoga by birth but allied to the 
Ganda influence in Bunyoro. This too seems to have exacerbated the fears 
of the Nyoro chiefs and possibly heightened the incipient rivalry between 
Byabacwezi, the leading Nyoro chief, and Miti, the leading alien chief 
within the governing iouncil. 
1Wilson to Commissioner 10 May 1904, ESA A12/5. 
2unyoro Chiefs, Grant of Estates to, ESA SMP 1019/06, includes the correspondence 
of land grants and the text of the 11 System of Chieftaincy in Unyoro, 1906. 11 
3 
Minute by H. Bell, 31 October 1906, ESA SMP 1019/06. 
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Indeed, the growth of Miti's direct territorial authority and his 
growing influence over the monarch seem to be the main sources of 
grievance among the Nyoro ruling elite. It is this last phenomenon 
which, in addition to produci_ng the ri va 1 ry between Mi ti and Byabacwezi 
as arch-collaborator, seems to have alienated a large number of the Royal 
Bito dynasty from the rule of Duhaga. Criticism of Duhaga for allowing the 
Ganda to gain a foothold (although Miti himself was invited to Bunyoro 
before Duhaga was made Mukama) and for granting too much power to his 
Ganda advisors was a prevalent theme among Duhaga's numerous Bito kins-
men. How much was sincere objection to Duhaga's failure to exercise 
royal authority and how much self-seeking opportunism among potential 
candidates for Duhaga's throne is difficult to say. But there is 
evidence to indicate that both forces were at work among the Bito clans-
1 
men. 
To this list of injuries must be added the insult of Ganda cultural 
imperialism. The use of Buganda as the official language of state and 
church may have rankled from the onset of Ganda influence. However, when 
the C.M.S. missionary in Bunyoro, A.B. Fisher, wrote a letter to the 
missionary in Toro, Henry Maddox, on the subject of encouraging the use of 
Luganda, he triggered off more than he knew. The letter, in arguing for 
the retention of Luganda in church affairs, pointed up the growth of 
1Interviews B/3, Martin Mukidi, 13 October 1968 and B/24 Z.K. Winyi and 
Z. K. Mugenyi, 2 November 1968. 
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Ganda influence sponsored by the Ganda chiefs in Bunyoro. 1 Maddox, 
a proponent of local language use, particularly in translating the Bible 
to make it as widely available as possible to the agricultural classes, 
read the letter aloud to the Toro Church Council. The council,· composed 
of many of the important Toro chiefs, had direct connections to the 
Nyoro chiefly hierarchy. We can assume that word passed very quickly 
from the Toro chiefs, who had fought a considerable struggle to secure 
both their political and cultural independence from Buganda, to the Nyoro 
chiefs, who were promptea to begin their own struggle to rid themselves 
of Ganda influence. 2 
Thus, at every level of Bunyoro's political hierarchy -- from the bakopi 
peasant cultivators suffering ' under the sting of new taxes and labor presta-
tions through the Nyoro sub-chiefs and chiefs jealous of the growing in-
fluence of their Ganda co-chiefs to the royal dynasty itself grievances 
against the colonial system which had introduced the Baganda to Nyoro poli-
tics were rampant. In February, 1907, the rebellion began when the Nyoro 
chiefs came forward to express their protest at the unhappy state of 
affairs i.n the kingdom. 
* * * 
1 Fi sher to Maddox, Chri,stmas 1905, Fi FisherCorrespondence, Mi crofi 1 m Makerere 
Library. 
2Thanks to Dr. Louise Pirouet for suggesting this interpretation based on her 
work in mission history, for the Department of Religions, Makerere University. 
See Steinhart, thesis, pp. 103-08 for Taro's cultural resistance. 
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The rebellion itself can be said to have begun in early February, 
1907, when in the absence of James Miti from the Lukiko or governing 
council, a new spirit of protest and defiance arose. Miti, through 
1 his II undue influence over the Mukama and thus over the Luki ko genera 11 y," 
had come to dominate the political life of the court. It is of some 
significance that the voice of protest was first raised while he was 
away in Buganda. Suspicion that Miti was recruiting more Baganda for 
service in Bunyoro may lie behind the talk of a Baganda conspiracy to oust 
the Nyoro title holders. 2 In any case, Miti's absence provided 11 a much 
desired opportunity to speak out. 11 At this stage, the protest remained 
strictly verbal and confined to the Lukiko, but the major themes of the 
rebellion were clearly articulated: anti-alien and anti-authoritarian 
feelings began to be voiced. 
According to the British officer, Cubitt: 3 
... the chief reason for this burst of feeling against 
the Waganda lies in the fact that the Mukama and chiefs 
asked H. E. the Commissioner if they could be given 
official and private miles (estates) and the Wanyoro 
are afraid that a lot of their land will be handed over 
to the Waganda. 
1
cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07. 
2Nyakatura, Abakama, p. 219. 
3 Cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07. Cf. 
Interview B/3, Martin Mukidi, 13 October 1968. 
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While Cubitt tended to dismiss such fears as groundless, the fact that 
the leading chiefs, i ncludi_ng the a 1 i en chiefs 1 ed by Mi ti , had petitioned 
the government for extensive grants of freehold land late in 1906 provided 
a major threat to the Nyoro cultivators and minor chiefs. It would be well 
to note that Cubitt's report speaks of the protestors as 11 Batongole, 11 
a Ganda term referring not only to the senior chiefs on the Lukiko, but to 
1 esser chiefs who, while they were Luki ko counci 1 ors, would not have shared 
in the distribution of land grants. If freehold tenure had been intro-
duced at this time as it had been earlier in Buganda, it might well have 
created a class of landed oligarchs whose economic control of land and _poli-
tical power reinforced each other. This would have created a monopoly of 
power from which the Nyoro populace and the minor chiefs would suffer. 
Thus, an anti-authoritarian element can be seen in the attempts to thwart 
the senior chiefs, including the alien chiefs, from gaining a permanent 
foothold in Bunyoro and vastly increasing their power by becoming land-
lords as well as chiefs. 
But, it was the anti-alien theme which came to predominate in Nyoro 
motivation. Miti's position as a Muganda chief focused their anti-authori-
tarian complaints. Originally, he had been invited to Bunyoro to teach the 
Nyoro chiefs how to rule. In his wake had come an influx of Baganda into 
the country, who as friends and followers of Miti had found themselves 
comfortable and often lucrative positions in the conquered province. They 
came as petty traders, evangelists, and eventually as minor chiefs and 
headmen, bringing with them a cultural arrogance, commercial and religious 
attitudes, and a desire for authority which was not calculated to win friends 
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among the Nyoro population. They began turning out the 11 rightful landholders" 
and assuming power at a grassroots level. Another complaint was "that the 
Waganda have brought nothing into the country, and that all the profits 
that they get they send over to (B)Uganda, thus impoverishing (B)Unyoro 
and enriching (B)Uganda ... 111 It is not difficult to see the formation 
of stereotyping of the alien exploiters which preceded the outburst of 
feeling against them. Both elements of anti-Ganda and anti-authoritarian 
protest were symbolically united in the protest ·against the twenty or so 
Baganda chiefs and in this Miti himself provided a perfect target. 
But, the groundswell of resentment against the chiefs was quickly 
channeled. The chief reason for the protest, the fear of land grants, 
was reduced to the fear of alienation of land and loss of authority to 
the alien intruders. In this the Nyoro senior chiefs were able to join. 
While the minor chiefs started the manifestations, it was the senior chiefs, 
Paulo Byabacwezi, Leo Kaboha and Katalikawe, who began to organize the protest 
to bring it to the next stage: the explusion of the Ganda chiefs. 2 By 
siding with the dissidents, the senior chiefs were able to channel the anti-
authoritarian resentment into more narrowly anti-alien protest, which still 
struck a responsive chord among the Nyoro populace. By early March, 1907, 
the Baganda were being driven out of the countryside by the threat of 
violence from the Nyoro 11 peasantry 11 and were seeking refuge at Hoima, the 
_capital. 3 
The British response to the expulsion of the Baganda was remarkably 
unimaginative. While Cubitt initially felt that the protest might be 
l Ibid. 
2Nakiwafu to Jemusi (Miti) Kago, 6 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07. 
3Fataki to Apolo Kagwa Katikiro, 7 March 1907 (trans.) ESA SMP 267/07. 
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viewed · as an opportunity for a 11 owing the Nyoro chiefs to govern under 
threat that any "regressive movement" would be handled by bringing the 
Baganda back, 1 Wilson, as Deputy Commissioner, insisted on upholding the 
letter of the law. He advised the district officer 11 to nip in the bud 
any attempt to interfere with the scheme of chieftainships proposed by 
the Lukiko and confirmed by the Commissioner according to the book pub-
2 
lished ... 11 in 1906 . Unhappy with the way Cubitt was handling the 
situation, Wilson dispatched another officer, Tomkins, who arrived in 
early April. 3 But, Tomkins arrived bearing instructions to strictly 
enforce the system of chieftaincy "according to the book. 11 Despite the 
statements of Byabacwezi that he and Kaboha had only "signed as they 
feared to do otherwise, and the Mukama did what Jamusi [Miti] told him, 11 
Tomkins was unable to retreat to a flexible solution to the crisis. 4 
Tomkins called a Baraza of all the senior chiefs and reminded them of 
the system of chieftaincy which had been agreed to by the chiefs and the 
Protectorate government. To the Nyoro chiefs' pleas of duress in their 
signing the agreement were added the catalogue of complaints against the 
the Ganda chiefs and Miti in particular. Tomkins reported that the ''great 
point with the Bunyoro chiefs is that they should be allowed to rule their 
own country as the chiefs of Toro, (B)Uganda, Ankole, etc., are allowed to 
do. 115 While this was not the great point of the Nyoro populace or of the 
1
cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07. 
2Wilson to Collector, Hoima (telegram) 13 March 1907, ESA SMP 267/07. 
3 Tomkins  to Deputy Cammi ss ioner ( te 1 egram) 7 April 1907 ESA SMP 267 /07. 
4Tomkins to Deputy Commissioner, 15 April 1907, ESA SMP 267/07. 
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lesser chiefs, it was a point which seems to have convinced Tomkins of 
the justice of the Nyoro case. 
By May there was no longer any time for continued protest. The 
Ganda chiefs had been thoroughly driven out of the country and were waiting 
in Hoima to be reinstated. Some huts had been burned, but no violence 
against persons had taken place. Still Wilson insisted on a hard line and 
Eden, the new district officer, called a Baraza and put it to the chiefs: 
They must reinstate the Baganda or risk losing their own positions. Even 
if the reinstatement were only temporary, subject to the government's review 
of the Nyoro grievances, it was the only term the Protectorate government 
would consider. On May 7 the order to reinstate the Baganda was read to 
the assembled chiefs, who refused to cooperate, contending that even if they 
were willing the bakopi or 11 peasants 11 could not be persuaded and wanted 
l the Baganda expelled. This the government considered an excuse. Apparently 
the absence of personal violence had convinced them already that this was 
a well-organized and controlled demonstration out of keeping with European 
stereotypes of African emotionalism and violent tendencies. 2 
Two more barazas on the 8th and 9th of May saw the Nyoro chiefs remain 
adamant, but calm, in their refusal to allow the Baganda to return to their 
villages even on a temporary basis. On the 9th Eden announced a four-day 
ultimatum after which if the Nyoro chiefs persisted in refusing they would 
jeopardize their positions. But, when Wilson's hard line was reiterated 
after the four-day grace, the Nyoro chiefs who had been assembled at the 
1 Eden to Wilson, 11 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Lwanga, Mi ti, pp. 50-51. 
2wilson to Spires, 28 May 1907, and Wilson to Elgin, 25 June 1907, ESA SMP 
710/07. 
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Post Office in Hoima not only refused but did so in loud and "passionate" 
terms. Two days later, May 16, the chiefs were again assembled, again 
refused, and this time, following the orders of Deputy Commissioner Wilson, 
fifty-four of the assembled rebels were arrested. This number included 
the names of senior and minor chiefs and important personages including 
many members of the royal Bito clan. 1 
Throughout the disturbances, the Mukama hewed to a neutral line. He 
insisted that he personally did not want the Baganda to leave, but that 
his chiefs were the motive force for expulsion. His failure to assume 
leadership in the protest has been laid to a weakness of character and 
the influence of his Baganda and missionary advisors. A more charitable 
view sees him in full support of the rebellion, but shrewdly avoiding a 
situation which would jeopa.rdiz·e his -authority and his throne. 2 In sup-
port of this contention, it is not unlikely that the Baganda leadership 
in Kampala coveted an even more direct subjugation of Bunyoro and might 
well have aimed at placing a member of the Ganda royal family on the Nyoro 
throne. In that light, Duhaga's neutrality may well have served to pre-
serve not only his own position, but it may have saved the Nyoro dynasty 
3 
and the peace of the country as well. 
1 Lwanga, Mi ti, pp. 51-52, and Eden to Wilson, 11 May 1907, and Wi 1 son to 
Elgin, 25 June 1907, ESA SMP 710/07. Cf. Interview B/19, Isaya Bi Bikundi, 
30 October 1968. See Uzoigwe, "The Kyanyangire, 1907, 11 pp. 149-59, for a 
detailed account of the events. 
2Interviews B/3 Martin Mukidi ., 13 October 1968, and B/34, Princess Alexandria 
Komukyeya, 11 November 1968. 
3Ibid., and Katyanku and Bulera, Duhaga, pp. 19-20. 
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Of the senior chiefs, Byabacwezi, who was considered by Eden as 
the ringleader, managed to escape arrest. In fact, Byabacwezi appears 
to have wavered and to have been pushed into a hard line position by 
his co-chief, Leo Kaboha, and particularly by his sub-chiefs. Byabacwezi 
was prepared to surrender to the British pressure were it not for fear of 
loss of popular support. It was reported that Byabacwezi had verbally 
agreed to the ultimatum on the 14th day of May, but on telling his sub-
chiefs this was derided into continued resistance. It was ''better to suffer 
with the rest and have the good opinion of others. Byabacwezi is said to 
have cried and to have decided to be a martyr rather than a turn-coat. " l 
It is the crucial role of the sub-chiefs that is deserving of note. 
Ibrahim Talyeba, the deputy (mumyoka) sub-chief under Miti, played a 
very prominent part in organizing the .disturbances and in persuading 
Byabacwezi to persist. Daudi Bitaluli, the deputy to Byabacwezi, was also 
among the leaders arrested. 2 Pressure from the leading sub-chiefs may well 
have been motivated by jealousy at the growth of Baganda title.holding 
which excluded them from the senior positions. · The large number of Babita 
among the sub-chiefs raises the question of the role of dynastic intrigue-, 
possibly against Duhaga and favoring a restoration of Kabarega, then in 
his eighth year of exile. In any case, it was believed by the -district 
' 
officer, Eden, 3 and would appear from the numbers of sub-chiefs arrested, 
1 Haddon to Co 11 ector, Unyoro, 19 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07. 
2Interviews B/44, Yesse T. Kinimi, 3 December 1968, and B/12, Nebayosi 
Tibangwa, 22 October 1968. These men are the sons of Talyeba and Bitatuli 
respectively 
3 Eden to Wilson, 11 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07. 
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that it was the second rank of Nyoro chiefs who initiated, organized and 
sustained the constitutional agitation and protest which Wilson could not 
believe was of local African authorship. While the British officials 
discounted the allegation by the chiefs that the bakopi were hostile to the 
Baganda and would ki 11 them if they returned to the vi villages, the role of 
both Bito and cormnoner sub-chiefs in the agitation lends credence to the 
contention that popular discontent with the growth of alien influence and 
the resulting social uncertainty was a powerful force in sustaining the 
11 rebell ion" by the chiefs. 
As a side note, the highly politically conscious nature of the 
rebellion as a constitutional protest can be illustrated by a unique 
man.euver by the Nyoro chiefs. During the disturbances envoys were sent to 
the neighboring kingdoms of Toro and Ankole and to Busoga and the 11 lost 
counties 11 in the hopes of finding allies there who might extend the anti-
Ganda rebellion throughout the Ganda dominated provinces. 1 Such an attempt 
to increase the pressure on the British to remove the Baganda chiefs by 
seeking a multi-tribal, albeit single issue, organization shows a political 
wi.sdom which we tend to identify with only the more modern of the African 
protest movements. The agitation for the return of the 11 1 ost counties, 11 
which .Wilson for one believed was the object of the entire exercJse, spread 
to that district and required the presence of a police force under Apolo 
Kagwa, _the Prime Minister of Buganda, to insure the "Pax Brittanica."2 
1 Isemonger to· Wilson, 18 June 1907, ESA SMP 267 /07. Cf. -Haddon to Co 11 ector, 
Unyoro, 19 May 1907, ESA SMP 267/ 07. 
2Lwanga, Miti, p. 53. Kagwa before being diverted to the 11 lost counties 11 
had been en route to Bunyoro in the company of a Ganda prince lending 
credibility to the suspicion of a Ganda conspiracy to undermine Nyoro 
11 sovereignty. 11 Cf. Katyanku and Bulera, Duhaga_ .. o. 19. 
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Deputy Commissioner Wilson arrived at Hoima on May 22, 1907, with 
police and military reinforcements. Unhappy at the handling of the dis-
turbances by the locarofficers, he felt that prolonged confrontation 
even after the arrest of over fifty agitators might well · 1 lead to 
violence against the Baganda still at Hoima. It was his purpose to put a 
quick finish to the spirit of rebellion. A new round of barazas was 
begun with Wilson presiding. 1 
On the 27th day of May judgment was handed down by ·W1lson. His 
awards reflect his prejudices and the element of necessity in colonial 
efforts to secure peaceful subordination. The four Nyoro senior chiefs 
implicated in the rebellion were most unevenly punished. Leo Kaboha was 
deposed from. his chieftaincy and exiled to Buganda. 2 Katalikawe was 
deposed and forfeited one-third of his land holdings. Daudi· Katongole lost
3 
one-third of his estates· and two years of tax revenues. Byabacwezi, 
who most of the British believed was the prime mover in the rebellion, 
lost a third of his estates and was fined 500 to be paid within two 
years. The fine was later reduced. Moreover, whatever debts were due to 
him from the Protectorate government for a decade of service in establish-
ing the regime of collaboration were considered as wiped out. 4 All in all, 
his penalties were -not harsh. · One wonders if leniency flowed from Wilson's 
I 
mer_ciful qualities and from the recognition of past services or if it
Lwanga, Mi ti, pp. 53-54, and Wi 1 son to Elgin, 25 ·June, 1907, ESA SMP 710/07. 
-- -
2Wilson, 11Award, 11 27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Interviews B/4., Pancras 
Kaboha, 25 November 1968 and B/42, William Kaboha, 26 November 1968. 
3 Wilson, 11 Award, 11 27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Interview B/19, Isaya 
Bikundi, 30 October 1968. 
4 Ibid. 
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resulted from a calculated realization of the importance of Byabacwezi 
to the functioning of any system of indirect rule and collaboration in 
Bunyoro. 
All those arrested on Maj 16 when the baraza threatened to erupt 
1 
into violence were to be removed to Buganda. Twelve of these fifty-
four were eventually deported from Uganda entirely. This number included 
Leo Kaboha, but was made up essentially of the most vocal agitators among 
the sub-chiefs. It was on these men that the pen a 1 ti es fell most heavily, 
comp 1 a i nts beingng received that their property was being confi seated and 
their wives and children were being driven off their estates. 2 
A word of sympathy was appended to the Award for the bakopi, whom 
Wilson felt had "not been deeply implicated." Even after the events, a 
real is tic assessment of the ro 1 e of popular support for the anti -Ganda 
and anti-authoritarian movement was not possible for the architects of 
British colonial overrule. The myth of a quiescent peasantry had to be 
3 preserved. 
4 
The last section of the award reads: 
The Unyoro chiefs, _who are Baganda, _ar, to be 
at once installed by a Government officer with proper 
impressiveness and with a fitting force. They will 
not be i nsta 11 ed as Baganda but as Unyoro chiefs, 
who were removed from their posts in violation of 
the law. 
1 ·. 
Ibid., and Manara to Wilson, 7 June 1907, ESA SMP 710/07. 
2
Various entries in "Deportation of Unyoro Chiefs, 11 ESA SMP 1367/07. 
3 Cf. M. Weisser sser, persona 1 communicationation, 24 March 1971, regarding a forth-
coming paper on peasant crime in Spain. 
4 Wilson, 
"Award," 27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Lwanga, Miti, pp. 54-56. 
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The Baganda were indeed restored and in that sense tte rebellion was 
a failure and the losses to the Nyoro organizers were suffered for 
nought. The huts of two Ganda chiefs were burned the following year 
and tensions continued to be high for several years. As a result, no 
. . . 
additional Ganda chiefs were appointed to positions in .Bunyoro and 
those in office were eventually reti retiredin favor of Nyoro successors .1 
Thus, a delayed and disguised success did attend this early protest 
•• j • • 
movement against a form of colonial overrule. Nyangire, along with 
I 
Kaberega's guerilla struggle of the previous decade, became a focus 
of Nyoro pride in the courage and defiance of their leaders. But, the 
"nationalist" pride of later generations does not establish the proto-
nationalist motives of the early resisters and orotesters. We must try 
"'"= 
to establish the nature of protest-generating sentiments without benefit 
of such hindsight and see where such sentiments might lead. 
* * * 
That the Nyangire Rebellion was not proto-nationalist in its 
motivation or organization seems evident from the events described. While 
the anti-Ganda strain, which came to dominate the protest mbvement, can be 
seen as particularist or "tribalist," that, too, would be an over-simpli-
fication. Traditional antipathies were certainly present, but to emphasize 
them ai the price of ignoring. the real and pressing grievances against 
the facts of colonial oppression is to flatten the texture of Nyoro society 
in transition. 2 The fear of Ganda expropriation of land by the sub-chiefs, 
\eakey to Deputy Cormnissioner, 31 January 1908 and 24 April 1908, ESA SMP 
C10/08; Eden, "Annual Report for 1911-12,"p. 56, ESA SMP 2135. 
2
see Uzoigwe; "The Kyanyangire, 1907, 11 while very richly documented, tends to 
treat the anti-alien sentiments and appeal to history as uniform among the 
various Nyoro classes, thus homogenizing Nyoro society for national1st purposes. 
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the resentment against Ganda office holding by the senior chiefs, and the 
beginnings of hostility by the agricultural population against the agents 
of "modernization" (i.e., against bureaucratic and capitalist intervention 
into 11 traditional" social and political life) all fed_ the p.rotest move-
ment. Popular anti-authoritarianism and elite fear of social disruption 
fused with the protest against alien domination to propel the Nyoro people 
toward rebellion. 
But, how can a rebe 11 io.n by the Nyoro chiefs be ca 11 ed anti -authori -
tarian? Here we see the peculiar contradiction of the collaborating 
chiefs writ large. They were under pressure from below to champion the 
anti-colonial struggle and countervailing pressure to administer the 
colonial state. These cross pressures were most evident in the arch-
collaborator Byabacwezi's ambivalence toward the struggle. But, the 
contradiction is a 1 so evidenced by the efforts of the co 11 abor.ati ng Nyoro 
leadership to organize and direct the protest not against alien authority 
in general but against the Baganda aliens in particular. By identifying 
the exercise of illegitimate authority with the Ganda chiefs, the Nyoro 
chiefs were able to appear as the champions of popular anti-colonial senti-
ment without stirring anti-authoritarian feelings against themselves as 
colonial agents. They were thus able to harness popular revolutionary 
impulses to sel selfseeking and parti cul ari st programs which at base contra-
dicted the impulses which propelled them. 
If this is our interpretation .of Nyangire, how can we relate it to 
other movements of anti-colonial protest or resistance? The answer, I be-
lieve, is that we must reinterpret the entire tradition of anti-colonial 
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protest from a perspective which allows us to see beyond the "nationalist"
flowering of later anti -colonial movements to a profounder understanding 
of the roots of revolt. 
Let me illustrate what must be done with an example ·from late colonial 
history . in Kenya.. Two rei nte:rpretati ons of the Mau-Mau, movement Were 
pu9 l i shed in the mi d-1960 1 s. By far the most i nfl u.enti al is thatt of Rosberg 
and Nottingham in their The Myth of "Mau Mau, 11 subtitled "Nationalism" in· 
Kenya. 111 Here we have made explicit the nationalist interpretation- of anti-
colonial uprisings. Mau-M.au is related to the developmentof nationalism 
in Kenya right back to the first resistance wars against the British in 
2 
vaders . .. Thwarted politically, nationalist sentiment . turns violent·, but · 
remains fundamentally nationalist. ·This view, which is infinitely preferable 
to the previous view of Mau-Mau as tribal atavism and savage frenzy, was 
quickly applauded by the nationalist historians of the "Dar es Salaam 
School." 3 
But, nationalism is not the only interpretation possible, nor, to 
my mind, the most useful. The same year which saw the publication of 
The Myth of "Mau Mau" also saw the -release of Barnett and Njama's Mau-Mau 
1c. Rosberg and J. Nottingham, The -Myth of "Mau Mau" (New York, Praeger, 1966). 
2 Ibid., pp. 7-16. 
3 J. Lonsdale, . "New Perspectives in Kenya History," African Affairs Vol. 66, 
no. 265, pp. 348-53. 
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f Within. 11 rom 1 t As the title indicates, the perspective is what matters. 
For Barnett's interpretation of Njama's autobiography emphasized another 
element in the rebellion_. Instead of the nationalist 11 communi ca tors" as 
the focus of the rebellion, Barnett emphasizes . the peasant partisans, the 
actual militants of the forest and mountains. From that perspective, i.e., 
from the bottom up, the roots of Mau-Mau lie not in nationalist organization 
but in the revolutionary, anti-authoritarian impulses of the African 
"peasantry." Such a view accords far better with the interpretation of 
the Nyangire Rebellion presented here. 
Instead of examining anti-colonial resistance, protest and libera-
tion movements through the distorting lens of nationalist mythology, we 
must create a better. "myth," one better suited to interpreting the reality 
of African protest. The meaning of nationalism must be stretched too far to 
accommodate protests such as Nyangire (or Mau Mau). 2 By focusing on the 
leadership, the communicators, be they chiefs or political party leaders, 
we have accepted an interpretation of anti-colonialism as "African nationalism," 
a movement to expel the aliens and restore "national" independence. If 
instead we look within the protest movements, at leaders and followers alike, 
we are apt to discover that the impulses which the leaders organize and 
interpret are profoundly anti-authoritarian and revolutionary rather than 
anti-foreign and "nationalist." A "myth of popular insurrection" may 
1
o. Barnett and K. Njama, Mau Mau from Within (London, MacGibbon and Kee, 
1966). -
2Even Thomas Hodgkin's fl flexibleb 1 e definition ti on seems too broad, to be of much use, 
as it covers too many non-national sources of anti-colonial sentiment. 
Cf. T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York, New York University 
Press, 1957), p. 23. 
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lead us further and deeper in our understandi_ng of twentietheth century 
movements of prates protestand liberation than the failing "myth of nationalismona 1 ism" 
l has brought us. · Working out this interpretation in detail is the 
arduous task facing historians and students of Africa who have found 
nationalism a "false start." 
1 For those offended by the advocacy of a substitute "myth" instead of a 
call for objectivity, let me first apologize by indicating that the 
·concept of it1terpretation can be substituted for that of myth and 
second recommend the .chapter on " Myth and Soc, ety 11 in F. Wel bourn and 
B. Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home (London, Oxford University Press, 1966) 
for an illuminating discussion of the role of myth in African societies 
under western impact
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EARLY GUSII RESISTANCE TO BRITISH RULE, 1905-14 
Robert M. Maxon 
Three times between 1905 and 1914 the British administration of what is 
now Kenya was involved in armed conflict with various sections of the Gusii 
people. Early Gusii resistance to British rule was first of all the result of 
some of the Gusii's attempting to stop British penetration of their home-
land and the seizure of their herds in 1905. Some of these Gusii continued 
to resist British rule even after the establishment of an administrative 
post in Gusiiland. Their refusal to reconcile themselves to the new order 
led to the spearing of a British official and a second sharp encounter with 
European military might in 1908. Although they had suffered two defeats 
at the hands of the British, many of the Gusii still were not resigned to 
European rule. This was demonstrated by the fact that when a convenient 
circumstance presented itself in 1914, they launched an attack on the British 
administrative center in Gusiiland. 
The military and punitive action which took place in response to Gusii 
resistance has been described in a variety of works, scholarly and non-
scholarly.1 These works have tended to view the resistance as having religious 
and/or emotional causes and therefore not being completely capable of rational 
explanation. Nevertheless, an analysis of the factors motivati.ng opposition 
indicates that in each instance Gusii resistance was motivated by real griev-
ances and was marked by a general desire to escape the imposition of British 
rule and its new system .of authority. 
The Gusii, who inhabit the highlands of southwestern Kenya just ad-
jacent to Lake Victoria, were little affected by the advent of British 
1 G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford 1966); W. Robert Foran, 
A Cuckoo in Ken a (London, 1936); H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kings African Rifles 
( Aldershot, 1956 ; Audrey Wipper, 11 The Gusii Rebels," in Robert I. Rotberg 
and Ali Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York, 1970). 
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influence and colonial rule in East Africa down to the first decade of 
the twentieth century. Because the area in which they lived lay rela-
tively far away from the caravan route to Uganda and later railway to 
Lake Victoria, neither the officials of the Imperial British East Africa 
Company nor of the Uganda Protectorate paid much attention to the Gusii. 1 
The closest administrative post to the Gusii was located at Kisumu. How-
ever, no attempts were made to contact the Gusii or to bring them under 
British administration. That the British knew anything at all about 
them was due to Gusii rather than British initiative. 
According to at least one anthropologist, the Gusii were divided 
among seven tribes. Used in this sense, the term refers to the largest 
sub-divisi-0n recognized within Gusii society. In LeVine's words: 
Each tribe ... far from being a unified political 
group was an alliance of the patrilineal clans in a 
defined area which recognized a common ancestor and 
totem animal distinct from other tribes and which 
acknowledged the possibility of compensation for 
homocide within the alliance.2 
In each unit, a common tradition was also a determinant of tribal identity. 
Prominent elders of the Mogusero, one of the Gusii 11 tribes, 11 were the 
initiators of contact with the British. These elders sent appeals to the 
British for aid. Several factors seem to have been involved in stimulating 
the Mogusero elders to seek out the British. The Mogusero were the smallest 
of all the Gusii 11 tribes. 11 Secondly, they occupied a tenuous position be-
tween the Nilotic-speaking Luo, who inhabited the lowlands closer to the 
1Gusiiland is the term used in this paper to describe the area inhabited by 
the Gusii who were usually referred to as the Kisii by Europeans during the 
colonial period. 
2Robert A. LeVine and Barbara B. LeVine, Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in 
Kenya (New York, 1966), pp. 3-4. 
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lake and the Getutu, the largest and most powerful Gusii tribe. , Around the 
turn of the century, Getutu . attacks on the Mogusero became i ncreasi·ngly 
severe. Their numbers reduced and scattered for protection among the Luo 
and in other parts of Gusiiland, the Mogusero became quite desperate. 
Because of their p 1 i ght, they decided . to send envoys to Ki sumu. Under the 
leadership of a prominent elder named Ombati, the mission sought British 
assistance against the enemies of Mogusero. 1 
A 1 though no he 1 p of the kind desired by the Mogusero was .offered by 
the British, both sides made valuable alliances for the future. Ombati 
proved most useful when the British later decided to establish themselves 
in Gusiiland, serving as guide and interpreter to the 1905 military ex-
pedition and keeping his people friendly toward the British until after 
colonial rule had been established. Alliance with the British, obviously 
the most powerful ingredient in the affairs of western Kenya at the turn 
of the century, seemed to offer the only chance of survival for the 
Mogusero. British military strength thus attracted the Mogusero, and 
as a result of British aid and favor, the small tribe was able to maintain 
an independent existence. 
Although Gusiiland officially became part of the East African pro-
tectorate in 1902, its transfer from Uganda's Eastern province did not 
result in the beginning of British rule over the Gusii. No immediate steps 
were taken to bring the Gusii under European control, but their neighbors 
to the east, the Kipsigis, and to the west, the Luo, were brought under 
British rule with the establishment of administrative stations in 1902 
1 . 
C. W. Hobley, Eastern Uganda: An Ethnological Survey (London, 1902), 
p. 51. 
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and 1903 respectively. 1 From both of these areas, the British were able 
to make contact with the Gusii and actually to visit Gusiiland. 
The first officials to attempt to enter Gusiiland and make contact 
with the Gusii met with varying responses. H. B. Partinoton, the officer 
in charge of Kericho, visited the North Mogirango in late 1904. He was 
'' 
received in friendly fashion by the people of the area as one of the most 
wealthy and influential men of North Mogirango, Ndubi, had visited Kericho 
on more than one occasion. 2 In contrast to this amicable reception, the 
attempt of another official, F. W. Isaac, to enter Getutu in early 1905 
was rendered "impossible by the defiant attitude of the Getutu. 11 3 
These differing responses to British penetration were to be typical 
of the Gusii response to the establishment of colonial rule. The people 
as a whole never put up a united front. This was reflective of the fact 
that the Gusii had no centralized relations between various tribes and 
clans. Even within the individual tribes, there were normally no per-
manent political institutions where decisions affecting the entire unit 
were made. In the course of the nineteenth century, moreover, the Gusii 
undertook united military action on only one occasion -- a great battle 
with the Kipsigis in the 1890's. Hostility and open fighting involving 
the various Gusii tribes and clans were not uncommon in precolonial times. 4 
1 Mungeam, p. 95 and G. A.S. Northcote, History of the District, Kenya 
National Archives (hereafter KNA): DC/KSI/3/4. 
2G.A.S. Northcote, The Kisii, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2 and H.B. Partington, "Some 
Notes on the Kisii People,"East African Ouarterly, II, No. 4 (1905), 275. 
3 Northcote, The Kisii. 
4Interview, P. Omwenga, 25 May 1969 and M. Oongo, 2 July 1969. According 
to Middleton and Tait, fighting among lineage groups ·is quite typical of 
peoples with no centralized political institutions. John Middleton and 
David Tait, eds., Tribes Without Rulers (New York, 1970), op. 19-22. 
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A realization that the response of the Gusii to British rule was not com-
pletely friendly or completely hostile is essential in understanding the 
nature of early Gusii resistance to 'British rule. 
Although the years 1902-1905 brought about closer contact between the 
Gusii and the British, it was Gusii relations with the Luo which were the 
most important cause of the hostilities which were to erupt in 1905. The 
Luo had previously been brought under British protection . . By early 1905 
Gusi i attacks and cattle raids, especially by the Getutu and Nchari, on 
the Luo-inhabited areas to the west of Gusiiland had become a problem 
that the administration could not ignore. According to G.A.S Northcote,1 
Assistant Collector in charge of Karungu from October 1904 to September 
1906, the Gusii were "daily raiding the Kavirondo [Luo] along their 
borders arid had terrorized their western neighbors." 2 The British could 
not ignore attacks on people who were, however tenuously, under their ad-
ministration and pr6tection. It was obvious that the raids could not be 
stopped nor compensation gained for the Luo without the use of armed forces. 
Thus Gusii relations with their Luo neighbors were the crucial factor in 
. . 
influencing the government of the East African Protectorate to dispatch a 
punitive force against Gusiiland which produced the first instance of armed 
conflict between the Gusii and the Bri.tish. 
A punitive expedition, besides serving its essential prupose, was 
deemed useful in British eyes as a spri ngbdard for the fulfillment of a 
long standing official ambition to establish administration over the Gusii. 
1 An Oxford graduate, Northcote joined the Colonial Service in 1904. He 
served in Kenya until after World War I and eventually rose in the Colonial 
Service to become Governor of Hong Kong. 
2 Northcote, The Kisii. 
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Both Sir Charles Eliot1 and his successor, Sir Donald Stewart, wished to 
see the Gusii brought under British rule. The latter also saw the area 
inhabited by the Gusii as a potential area for European settlement. Fol-
lowing the dispatch of a punitive expedition against the Sotik living to 
the east of Gusiiland in June 1905, Stewart wrote to the Colonial Office 
of his intentions: 
After the Sotik have been brought to reason, I hope the 
Kisii will give no trouble. It is most important to open 
this part of the Protectorate which is well adapted for 
European settlement ... some of the Kisii are friendly 
and want us to establish a Government post in their coun-
try, but a large portion of this tribe is inimical and 
will be likely to give trouble. I have however great 
hopes that the punishment of the Sotik will bring them 
to reason.2 
It was thus with more than one motive in mind that a mi 1 itary patro 1 
. ' 
was dispatched against the Gusii in September 1905. The officially stated 
objects of the patrol were ''to obtain compensation for the murdered 
Kavirondo, if possible fine the culprits and select a suitable site for 
a new stati_on in Kisii country. 11 3 The patrol consisted of one hundred men 
of V Compa_ny of the 3rd King's African Rifles (KAR) stationed at Kericho. 
Captain E. V. Jenkins was selected to command the force and Northcote was 
named to accompany the patrol as Chief Political Officer. 4 .. Fifty police 
from Kisumu were also assigned to the patrol. 
1 SirCharles Eliot, East Africa Protectorate (New York, 1966), p. 194. 
2Stewart to Lyttleton, 8 June 1905, C.A. 533/2. 
3 J. D. Mackay,. I nte 11 i gence Report of 3rd Batta 1 ion KAR for September 1905, 
enclosure in Jackson to Lyttleton, 19 September 1905, C.0. 534/1. 
4 Ibid. 
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The forces of the South Mogirango, ,Nchari, and Getutu "tribes" were 
involved in resisting the encroachment of the British. Since these· groups 
as yet had not submitted to alien authority, this movement cannot be seen 
as a revolt against British rule. Rather, the opposition that the patrol 
encountered was self defense in response to the -aggression of the invadinq 
force 1
Throughout the first two weeks it spent in Gusi .i 1 and, the patrol sought 
principally to collect cattle as fines for transgressions of the Gusii into 
Luo territory. When the cattle were not given over, as was almost always 
the case, forcible means of collection were resorted to. Individuals and 
groups of Gusii defended their homes and flocks against British attack, 
· but the superior weapons of the patrol overcame this resistance and large 
numbers of cattle were captured in South Mogirango, Nchari and in western 
Getutu. 
An a 11 i ance between Ombati of Mogusero and the British was a cruci a 1 
factor in determining the nature of the conflict. Ombati had accompanied 
the British patrol as an interpreter. He used this position to pay off 
old scores with the Mariba clan of Nchari for the refusal of one of them · 
to pay dowry for his sister. He also took revenge on the western Getutu, 
1Most notable T. 0. Ranger, "Connexions Between 'Primary Resistance' Movements 
and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa: II." Journal of 
African History, IX, No. 4 ( 1968) , 632 and Wi pper p. 380. The 1 a tter source 
adopts this tenni no 1 ogy from W. · Robert Foran. Writing in 1935, Foran' s 
account of the 1905 fighting, which Dr. Wipper accepts as completely factual 
and quotes from at length, contains a large amount of inaccuracy. The best 
example of this is her assertion that he took part as the leader of a detach- 
ment of 100 police. Foran, p. 177. The official report filed by the com-
manding officer just after the completion of the patrol indicates that the 
police contingent accompanying it only numbered 50 and that Foran was de-
finitely not in command. E. V. Jenkins· , General Report on the Kisii Patrol, 
enclosure in Jackson to Elgin, 9 ·December 1905, C. 0. 534/1. 
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who were the worst enemies of the Mogusero.l Consequently, due to 
Ombati's influence, the most severe fightinq took place with the 
western Getutu and the Nchari In Nchari sixty-seven people were 
killed, while the hostilities in Getutu resulted in another sixty 
deaths. 2 The fact that there were no casualties on the British side 
attested to the one-sided nature of the battles. 
The patrol left behind a legacy of ill feeling which continued to 
be remembered long after its departure from Gusiiland. The casualties, 
the loss of cattle, and the burning of homes were especially remembered 
by the Getutu of the areas affected by the fiqhtinq. These grievances, as 
well as the association of the British with Ombati, were sources of bitter-
ness and antagonism against the British and the Mogusero even after the 
establishment of administration in other parts of Gusiiland. Although the 
patrol had inflicted relatively severe punishment, it had not broken the 
spirit of most men in western Getutu, nor made them anxious to accept 
British rule. 3 
Because of the absence of available British personnel, it was not 
until 1907 that a site for the construction of a government station was 
selected. 4 The station, to be known as Kisii, was located in Getembe, 
which bordered on the territories of Getutu, Nyaribari, and Nchari. 5 
1 Interview: Andrew -Mokaya, 4 July 1969; Mzee Ongaro, 2 July 1969. 
2 Jenkins, General Report on the Kisii Patrol. 
3 Interview: Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1969; _Petta Omwenga, 25 May 1969. 
4 Report of the Province of Kisumu for Year 1905-06, KNA PC/NZA/1/1. 
5 It is perhaps worth noting at this point that Kisii was not, as Dr. Wipper 
claims, situated in the middle of Getutu location. Nor was the site of Kisii 
·near the homeland of the Bogonko ''clan'' to whom she gives exaggerated import-
ance in future resistance to British rule. The Boqonko lived on the Manga 
escarpment rising to the east of Kisii. Travel between this area was not easy, 
and for this reason British contact with the Bogonko was not great. Wipper, p. 385 
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Northcote was put in charge of the Kisii station. In May 1907 he began 
to construct permanent buildings, thus signaling the establishment of 
British rule in Gusiiland. 1 
Northcote was moderately successful in making his influence felt among 
many of the Gus ii tribes.· He succeeded in se 1 ecti nq and apooi nti ng chiefs 
and headmen, and in encouraging men to bring disputes before the administra-
tion for settlement to him. Both the hostility of the people and the large 
population of Getutu made it a difficult area to administer. Although 
Northcote had succeeded in appointing chiefs for all other tribes by the 
end of 1907, he had only been able to install a few headmen among the 
Getutu.2 Thus, the Getutu were the only 11 tribe 11 over which a British 
appointed chief had not been placed. Moreover, almost no one from western 
Getutu brought their disputes to Northcote for settlement. 
Northcote's arbitrary rule did nothing to convince the Getutu that 
there were advantages in submittin9 to the British. In gathering building 
materials and supplies for the men at work in constructing the station, 
Northcote often resorted to force when sufficient supplies were not im-
mediately available through sale or barter. 3 Despite the fact that the 
grain and animals were later paid for, the effect of the use of such 
· force· served only to further alienate and estrange large sections of the 
Getutu. 
1Diary of G.A.S. Northcote (hereafter referred to as Northcote's 'Diary) 
24 May 1907, KNA: DC/KS I /4/1 . 
2 Ibid., 11 and 12 June 1907. 
3 In June 1907, for example, Northcote went into Getutu and took grain, 
goats, and sheep by force after his orders for meat and grain to be 
brought into the station had produced no results. Ibid., 6 and 8 June 1907. 
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Thus, unlike the other Gusii 11 tribes 11 some sections of the Getutu 
never accepted British rule. This was especially true of the Bogeka 
section which refused to co-operate with the European intruder. The 
inhabitants of Bogeka had been relatively hard hit by the patrol of 
1905. It also bordered on Mogusero, and the people of Bogeka disliked 
British connections wtth Ombati. On hearing complaints in June 1907 
from Luo living adjacent to Bogeka, Northcote went to the area, but 
he found the local elders were unwilling to meet him. Though he 
threatened them with reprisals, the inhabitants of the region did not 
bring in the cattle they were alleged to have stolen from the Luo or 
the fine levied by Northcote for the killing of two Luo men. 1 
Since the Bogeka were unwilling to concede that the British adminis-
trator had the right to command, Northcote decided to rely on more force-
ful measures. Faced with the problem of further cattle thefts in this 
area, he sent out thirty-five policemen to recover the stolen cattle. 
The police were attacked and they killed at least four of the attackers 
before returning to Kisii. 2 Although Northcote kept only sixty-five head 
of cattle and returned the rest, this incident did not do much to endear 
the British presence in Gusiiland to these Getutu. 
At this juncture, many of the Bogeka began to look to religious forces, 
and more .specifically, to the teaching of a prophetess for inspiration. The 
prophet tradition among the Getutu was not a new phenomenon created by the 
arrival of the foreigners. In the years immediately preceding the coming 
of the British, for example, the great prophet Zakaw had wielded 
1Ibid., 8 June 1907. 
2 Ibid., 26 July 19071 
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important· influence and authority in the area. Generally conceded to 
have supernatural powers, he had been the main instigator of Getutu cam-
paigns against the Mogusero. Thus, Gusii social structure already pos-
sessed an institution which could becalled upon to lead resistance 
against the British. 1 
Bogeka grievances against the British, therefore, found articulation 
in the person of the influential prophetess, Muraa. She had spoken out 
against the intrusion of the British from the moment that they had first 
set foot in Gusiiland. According to elderly Getutu who remember her, 
she continuously agitated against British presence in Kisii. A constant 
theme was to denigrate the valor of young men who seemed to be afraid of 
a single white man. For Muraa amd many other Getutu, Northcote was the 
administration. His elimination would thus have seemed to them to have 
meant an end to the alien occupation of Gusiiland. 
Northcote was not unaware of the ability of Muraa to strengthen and 
influence resistance in Bogeka and vicinity. In November 1907 hear-
rested her following a struggle in which one man was wounded. After hold-
ing a large baraza (public discussion) with prominent elders in the area, 
the Assistant District Commissioner felt that the people of the region 
had seen reason and would be more 'friendly to the administration. 2 
This, however, was not to be the case. By January of the fo 11 owing 
year, further trouble had developed in the area. In December of 1907 
the Assistant District Commissioner had begun tax collection in Gusiiland. 
Since the administration insisted that the tax be paid in money, Gusii 
1Interview: Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1968; Morris Oongo, 25 May 1969 . 
. 2 Northcote I s· diary, 24 November 1907. 
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men were forced to sell cattle, goats and sheep in order to obtain rupees 
with which to pay the tax. As a result, many Swahili and Somali cattle 
traders were drawn to the district. In early January when Swahili traders 
were in Bogeka, they had some money stolen from them by a man named Otenyo. 
The traders reported the matter to Northcote who decided to investigate the 
charge. Northcote was taken by some elders to Otenyo's home. The inhabi-
tants of the adjacent village ran away, and althoughf Northcote called on 
them to return, they refused. After waiting for approximately an hour 
for the accused to send him a cow, Northcote took two cows and proceeded 
on his journey. 
Northcote never completed his journey because he was attacked and 
speared. According to Getutu accounts, when Muraa, who had been released, 
saw the Assistant District Commissioner taking the cattle away, she be-
came infuriated. No doubt remembering the events of November, she began 
to insult the young men nearby in very abusive terms. She told them that 
they were just like women -- did not they care that their cattle were being 
taken? On hearing this abuse, Otenyo picked up his spear and went off 
along the route Northcote was following. He got ahead of the British of-
ficial and lay waiting for him in the tall grass beside the path along 
which Northcote was riding. As Northcote was passing on his horse, some-
what behing the police detail accompanying him, Otenyo threw his spear at 
the official and struck him in the back inflicting a painful but not 
fatal wound. 1 
1Foran states that Northc6te was riding out to investigate disturbances 
that the former had alerted the Assistant District Commissioner about just 
prior to the time of the spearing. Foran, p. 338. Northcote's Diary 
agrees conclusively with accounts of the event provided by old men in what 
is today Bogeka sub-location that the actual sequence of events was as set 
out above. Northcote's Diary, 11 January 1908. Interview: P. Omwenga, 
25 May 1969; Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1969. This is only one of the many in-
stances in Foran's account of the 1908 fighting which gives exaggerated 
importance to his role in events. 
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This spearing of a British administrative officer was of considerable 
significance as it touched off open resistance on the part of the Gusii 
and led to harsh punitive measures from the British side. Several writers 
have regarded this incident as the sole manifestation and reason for Gusii 
hostility and have pl aced the b 1 ame on Muraa 1 She is thus seen as having 
also 
not only produced hostility to British rule but also tohave caused the dis-
content that led to fighting between the Getutu and the British. News-
paper accounts of the time took this line as well, blaming the resistance 
on the "anti-European crusade being persistently preached by tribal 
witchdoctors. 112 
Though perhaps soothing to the imperialist mind, the idea that this 
resistance resulted entirely from the evil machinations of a female "witch-
doctor," and that because her influence was based on magico-religious 
sanctions it was irrational, hardly represents the true picture. There is 
no doubt that Muraa played a considerable part in the spearing of Northcote, 
believing perhaps that with his death the British presence would vanish. 
Nor can it be doubted that the fact that Muraa was regarded as having 
magical powers gave her considerable influence in western Getutu.. Yet, 
those interpretations which focus on Muraa, the nature of her influence and 
the emotional character of her appeal, nevertheless greatly oversimplify· the 
issue, for it is possible to suggest rational and understandable reasons for 
her oppositton to the British. According to some present day elders, she 
was motivated by the fear, based on the initial contacts of other Gusii 
groups with the British, that the coming of colonial rule would mean an 
l . For example: Foran, p. 342; W1pper, p. 411; J.A. Hunter and Dan Mannix, 
African Bush Adventures (London, 1954), pp. 202-03. 
2East African Standard (25 January 1908), p. 11. 
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end to her own influence., No matter what her own motivations, moreover, 
Muraa did not have to invent hostility to the British among the people of 
Bogeka. Antagonism to the British was great as a result of the events of 
1905 and what most people considered the arbitrary seizure of cattle on 
more than one occasion. Muraa's incitement of the spearinq served to 
touch off armed resistance to British rule, but she did not create the 
grievances that caused it. 
After the spearing, Northcote was carried back to Kissi by the 
police accompanying him, but he was still in great danger. He took im-
mediate steps to protect the station and to get word to his superiors. 
He sent two policemen with news of the attack to provincial headquarters 
at Karungu. Although confined to his bed, Northcote arranged his meagre 
forces for the defense of the station. 2 
With the spearing of Northcote, there was general rejoicing in 
Bogeka at the removal of European rule. British authority would not now 
be effectively extended to them. The younq men in Bogeka and the sur-
rounding areas of western Getutu took up arms to attack and destroy the 
most obvious manifestations of alien domination: Kis3i town and its alien 
inhabitants. When it was learned on the day after the spearing that North-
cote was not dead, large numbers took up arms and set off for Kisii to 
attack the town. 
This was thus a crucial day for the safety of the station. Around 
noon on January 12th, the Getutu began to mass on the hills surrounding 
Kisii. The bedridden Assistant District Commissioner had already concentrated 
1Interview: Paul Nyamweya, 28 May 1969; Erasto Abuqa, 8 July 1969. 
2Northcote's Diary, 12 January 1908. 
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the forces at his disposal around his house. Barbed wire was laid down, and 
a 11 who knew how to use a rifle were armed. Northcote a 1 so co 11 ected a 11 
the women, traders, and servants in Kisii outside his house. This made 
an imposing looking force, but most were unarmed., The sight of all 
these people, however, was enough to dissuade the forces on the hillside 
from attacking. In 1905 many of them had learned the folly of attacking 
a force armed with rifles. They withdrew from the vicinity of Kisii and 
never really threatened it again. 
Although an assault was not launched on Kisii, many Getutu found 
other targets for their revenge. The two most important categories of 
people selected for Getutu revenge were those whom the colonial system 
had introduced into Gusiiland, and secondly, the groups which the British 
had protected. Raids were made on the Luo living in the neighboring 
location of Membo. Cattle were stolen, huts burned, and at least two 
Luo men killed. 2 This was the kind of activity that Northcote had pre-
viously used force to try to stop. It is significant also that the others 
who died as a result of western Getutu taking up arms two policemen and 
an Indian trader -- were brought to Gusiiland by British rule. These acts 
and the spearing itself clearly represented the desire of the people of 
western Getutu to resist the inauguration of British rule among them and 
to see the alien presence removed from Gusiiland altogether. 
Throughout the disputes between the British and the western Getutu, 
the other sections of the Gusii remained outside of the fray. On the 
1Northcote to his father, 12 February 1908, KNA.: DC/KSI/4/1. 
2 J.D. Mackay, Report on Operations Against the Rebellious Sections of the 
Kisii Tribe (hereafter Mackay's Report), enclosure in Sadler to Elgin, 
3 March 1908, C.0. 533/42. 
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same day as the threatened attack on Kisii, most of the qovernment ap-
pointed chiefs went to the station to pledge their ·loyalty to the 
administration. 1 Those members of the western Getutu who were in revolt 
against the British seem to have made no attempts to win the allegiance 
and support of the other Gusii "tribes.II The attack on Northcote had 
not been planned well in advance. More than likely, those who had 
taken up arms never considered joining in a common cause with the other 
"tribes" against the British. In this way both those who joined and 
those who abstained from the revolt were obeying the principles of Gusii 
tradition: namely that joint action and a united front against a common 
enemy were not part of the Gusii political heritage. 
Gusii attacks on the Luo and the killing of the policemen and trader 
convinced the British that strong punitive action was necessary. John 
Ainsworth, Provincial Commissioner of Kisumu Province and a veteran ad-
ministrator in the East African Protectorate, received a letter on January 
12 from Northcote detailing the spearing. Because Ainsworth decided that 
the problem was limited to a small group, he proceeded to Gusiiland to 
investigate the incident with only a small patrol of KAR. 2 On the 14th 
he received word of the further raids which he termed "a general rising of 
the Kitutu clan against the government." 3 He therefore initiated sterner 
measures; the Assistant District Superintendent of Police at Kisumu, 
1Northcote's Diary, 12 January 1908. 
2John Ainsworth, Report to the P.C. Kisumu to H.E. the Governor on the 
Recent Kisii Revolt and its Suppression (hereafter Ainsworth's Report), 
enclosure in Sadler to Elgin, 3 March 1908, C. 0. 533/42. 
3 Ibid. 
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Robert Foran, was sent to Kisii with all available police. Though he had 
only recently returned from Gusiiland, Foran set off the same day with a 
force of fifty-two men. 1 Ainsworth also ordered the 5th KAR stationed 
at Lumbwa to send fifty men to Kisii. At the same time, the Provincial 
Commissioner wired the Governor tellinq of the further hostilities. It 
was this telegram which led to the dispatch of a full scale punitive 
expedition against the Gusii. 2 
The government quickly set in motion the steps necessary for the dis-
patch of an anned force to defeat the Gusii. A contingent of 327 KAR 
with fourteen British officers was sent to Kisumu by train. On January 22, 
the force, which had been augmented by fifty Nandi levies and John Ainsworth 
as Chief Political Officer, entered Gusiiland. The expedition succeeded 
in capturing cattle, burning huts and killing anyone who tried to stand 
3 
in its way.· 'Even though the Getutu avoided pitched battles, their spears 
proved no match for the rifles and machine-guns of their adversary. By 
February 5, when the operation came to a close, the Gusii had suffered con-
s i derab 1 e 1 asses. Two hundred and forty men had been ki 11 ed, over seven 
thousand head of cattle were in the hands of the invading force, and another 
five thousand sheep and goats had been seized. During the entire engaqement 
1Foran, p. 338. This account· also contains some exaaoeration in the time 
it took Foran to make the trip. 
2Ainsworth's Renart. 
3Northcote thouqht the whole ooeration too severe and ooorlv carried out. 
"It would take too long," he later wrote his father, "to describe the 
absolute idoicy, obstinacy and want of knowledge of military operations 
in this country that they shewed. 11 Northcote to his father, 12 Feb. 1908. 
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the British forces suffered no loss of life. 1 
The severity of the suppression of the Getutu was justified in 
British eyes as necessary to teach the Getutu and in effect the entire 
Gusii people a lesson and ensure acceptance of British rule. After the 
end of military activity, Angwenyi, who had not taken up arms against 
the colonial government, was made chief of Getutu. With the appointment 
of a single chief for every Gusii tribe, the British settled down to be-
gin a systematic form of administration in all parts of Gusiiland. With 
the punitive expedition clear in the memory of both Getutu and non-Getutu, 
there was no open challenge to the colonial authorities. 2 
Yet the very harshness and brutality of the KAR left a legacy of 
hostility and bitterness among many Gus ii. Whi 1 e armed defiance to 
alien rule was obviously out of the question, this did not mean acceptance 
of it or acquiescence to the changes it brought. Given the oroper circum-
stances, many Gusii would demonstrate their opposition in other ways. 
In many ways the political, economic and social changes introduced 
and brought about by the British in the years before the First World War 
tended to keep alive and reinforce feelings of antagonism for British 
rule among the Gusii. Very significant and, in some instances, quite far 
reaching alterations were brought about in the lives of the Gusii. Chanqes 
in Gusii institutions were initiated and new patterns of behavior were ex-
pected. While the Gusii did not openly oppose these _innovations, many 
disliked the adjustments required of them. In this way discontent, and no 
doubt a longing for a return to the past, continued to be felt by most of 
the people. 
1Ainsworth's Report. 
2 In looking at the causes and courses of the hostilities in both 1905 and 
1908, it is impossible to sustain Dr. Wipper's conclusion that "both were 
premeditated and planned, determined and persistent on the part of the 
Gusii. 11 Wipper, p. 384. 
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The political and judicial systems that began to function all over 
Gusiiland after the suppression of the 1908 resistance were quite differ-
ent from those existing in colonial times. The Gusii tribes, with the 
exception of the North and South Moriango, each came to fonn the basis 
of a new administrative unit. The chiefs of each of these divisions were 
granted more powers and responsibilities than any individual had ever 
possessed in pre-colonial times. The same could be said for the judicial 
system that was imposed on the Gusii. This was especially true in criminal 
cases, where the novel concepts introduced by the British reoresented a 
radical departure from the pre-colonial pattern. Consequently, criminal 
procedure did not gain wide acceptance among the people. 
Some of the social and economic innovations which marked the first 
years of colonial rule necessitated new forms of behavior and activity 
that were not easily accepted. Egeserate or cattle villages were abolished 
by administrative order in 1912, and Gusii young men, who had traditionally 
lived there and guarded their families' cattle, were brought more under con-
trol of the elders. 1 Economic changes also caused much dislocation and 
difficulty. The capture of large numbers of cattle by the 1908 expedition 
deprived many Getutu of their most important source of wealth. Despite the 
fact that some were returned as payment for road building, most Getutu con-
tinued to resent the appropriation of their cattle. The most distasteful 
aspect of the new economic system was the British insistence that able 
bodied men should leave home and seek wage paying employment. However, 
1
see LeVine and LeVine, p. 29. 
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because of Gusii opposition to these demands very few men could be obliged 
to obey the new strictures. It was not until 1913, when the British be-
gan to force men to work away from home, that any substantial .numbers 
began to leave the village. 1 ,2· 
That the Gusii did not accept European rule wholeheartedly is illus-
trated further by the Gusii reaction to the coming of Christian missions. 
The Roman Catholic Mill Hill Fathers opened a .mission station at Nyabururu 
outside Kisii in December 1911. 3 Little interest was shown in what they 
had to offer. In his history of the Mill Hill Fathers, Gale has put the 
case most graphically: "The Bakisi themselves were unfriendly to the 
mission because they associated all white men with those who had led the 
punitive expedition against them. 114 The Seventh Day Adventists, who be-
gan mission work in 1913, were even less successful. By the beginning 
of World War I, they had not succeeded in making a single convert. 5 
Most Gusti had not completely reconciled themselves to British rule 
and the resulting innovations by the beginning of World War I. Many still 
remembered with bitterness the fighting of 1905 and 1908 and the memory 
acted as a deterrent against any direct challenge to the colonial administra-
tion. Yet when the opportunity presented itself, Gusi.i hostility to British 
rule would come violently to the surface. 
1south Kavirondo 1st Quarterly Report for 1911-12, KNA: DC/KSI/1/1. 
2 SKDAR 1913-14, KNA: DC/KSI/1/a. 
3or. Wipper is wrong in saying Nyaribari. Wipper, p. 388. 
4 H. P. Gale, Uganda and the Mill Hill Fathers (London, 1959) p. 299. 
5 SKDAR 1913-14. 
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The German invasion of September 1914 presented the Gusii with 
just such an opportunity. On hearing that the Germans were approaching 
Kisii, the District Conmissioner and his staff evacuated the station. 1 
In the course of their withdrawal to the lake port of Kendu, they met 
three companies of KAR on their way to do battle with the Germans, Early 
on the 12th, the District Commissioner, C. E. Spencer, accompanied the KAR 
force back to Kisii which they found occupied by the Germans. After a 
battle which lasted until the early afternoon, both European forces with-
drew from the town. Except for a few Indian traders and wounded German 
soldiers, Kisii was left unoccupied. 2 
The Gusii now took their opportunity to vent their spleen against 
the British. Large numbers of Gusii from Getutu, Nyaribari and Nchari 
entered the town. They sacked and looted most of the buildings. The 
damage done to the commercial and government buildings, especially the 
District Commissioner's house, was quite extensive. 3 The Roman Catholic 
and Seventh Day Adventist mission stations, previously evacuated, were 
looted as well .4 
1Wipper places the date, wrongly, on September 19. Wipper, p. 391. 
2Eas t African Standard ( 19 September 1914), p. 17; W. T. Shorthouse, "The 
Battle of Ki s ii , 11 extract from Sport and Adventure in Africa, KNA: DC/ KS I/ 3/ 6. 
3 The hospital was so severely damaged that the Medical Officer from Kisumu 
stated after a visit to Kisii that "the Kisii Dispensary no longer exists." 
J. Hannigan to Principal Medical Officer, 15 October 1914, KNA: Ministry 
of Health, Medical 43/235. 
4 SKDAR 1914-15, KNA: DC/KSI/1/2. 
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When the British returned on the afternoon of the 13th, they decided 
to employ stern punitive measures. The District .Commissioner ordered all 
things taken from Kisii to be returned/ The KAR undertook operations 
against the parts of Getutu, Nyaribari and Nchari deemed most responsible. 
A fine of 10,000 cattle was 1 evi ed and co 11 collectedby force. 1 In addition, 
more than sixteen hundred men were sent out to work, after ·being called 
Kisiif b 2 into 1 s11 or a araza. 
Although this brief uprising clearly indicated Gusii dislike for 
British rule, later- colonial officials3 and some scholars4 have not properly 
assessed the ro 1 e played by the concrete grievances of the Gusi i as a · 
motive for the sacking of the town. Rather, they stress the role of ·the 
cult of Mumbo (known as Nyamumbo to the Gusii) as motivating ·Gusii resistance 
in 1914. In Dr. Wipper's words. 
The sect's existence became patently evident on September 19, · 
1914, when the Germans invaded Kisii from what was then Ger-
man East Africa and the British vacated the town in order to 
mobilize resistance and return. Believing Mumbo's prophecy 
that the British would soon depart, the local inhabitants 
mistook their temporary exodus for the5millenium and looted the town and the neighboring missions. 
1w. M. Logan, History of the Wakisii or Abagusti, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2. 
2 C. E. Spencer to J. Ainsworth, 30 September 1914, KNA: PC/NZA. 3/65/47. 
Interview: Paul Nyamwega, 28 May 1969. 
3
see for example: District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 1 Aug-
ust 1928, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2. 
4 Wipper, p. 391. 
5 Ibid. 
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Mumboism seems to have first developed among the Luo of Central 
Kavirondo (later Central Nyanza) in 1913. From there it spread to South 
Kavirondo, carried, according to Dr. Wipper, by Seventh Day Adventist 
mission adherents. It rejected European customs, emphasized traditional 
mores, and advocated a return to the way of life existing before the 
coming of European rule. It promised the destruction of the colonial 
order. The world was to undergo a great cataclysm at which time a 
terrible vengeance would befall the enemies of the Mumboites. 1 It also 
promised the coming of a millenium in which the believers in Mumbo would 
be blessed with utopian wealth in abundance. 2 The implication of all this 
was that the early departure of the British was expected by believers. 
Merely because the withdrawal of the British from Kisii seems to fit 
in with Mumbo teaching about the departure of the Europeans and the 
impending millenium does not provide proof that Mumbo teachings were in-
fluential enough in 1914 to cause the looting of the station. Neither is 
the fact that Mumboism won a following in Gusiiland in later years a suffi-
cient reason. It must be fairly conclusively shown that Mumboism did exist 
among the Gusii before September 1914. 
There is really no evidence of the existence of Mumboism as a strong 
force among the Gusii in September 1914. There is no contemporary docu-
mentary evidence which would suggest that Mumboism was the cause of this 
incident. It is mentioned nowhere in the correspondence regarding the up-
1 
Ibid., p. 397. 
2Ibid., p. 398. 
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l 
rising in 1914 and 1915. The only piece of evidence that gives the 
impression of Mumbo responsibility for the sacking of Kisii is a letter 
written by Father Sheffer of the Roman Catholic mission at Asumbi to 
the District Commissioner in 1918. In general very hostile to the cult 
of Mumbo, Father Sheffer stated that "Mumbo people were responsible for 
' 2 
the looting of September 1914. 11 Yet Asumbi lay in Luo country, and the 
looting described no doubt refers to the looting of the mission station 
by Luo that took place in that month. In 1914 Father Sheffer had been 
in the area for little more than a year, and his contact with Gusii must 
have been minimal. This letter is, in short, extremely inconclusive 
proof that Mumboism was responsible for the attack on Kisii in 1914. 
In fact, a fairly large amount of evidence indicates that Mumboism 
and Mumbo teachings were not involved in the looting at all. Gusii 
elders who remember the sacking of the station unanimously deny that 
Mumboism had any part in the events of September 11 and 12. 3 Administra-
tion records dating from 1914 and 1915 verify this fact. In 1915 a 
fairly thorough investigation was undertaken of Mumboism in the district. 
1For example, see: SKDAR 1914-15; Spencer to Ainsworth, 30 September 1914. 
Even in 1918, Ainsworth did not regard Mumboism as threat to peace and order. 
In describing his experience with the movement he wrote: 11 I failed to 
detect in it any disloyal or harmful tendency and formed the opinion that 
to take official notice of the matter was to do more harm than good.'' It 
seems certain that he could not have written these words if he had thought 
that Mumboism had been responsible for the sack of Kisii. 
2 P. Sheffer to District Commissioner, 1 December 1918, KNA: DC/KSI/3/1. 
3 Interview . nterv1ew: Paul Nyamwega, 28 May 1969; Eras to Abuga, 27 May 1969. 
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The complete reports of this investigation show that it was carried 
out only in Luo areas. 1 It seems most unlikely that if the cult were 
strong enough in Gusiiland to result in the looting of Kisii, the 
administration would not have investigated it there as well. 
It is most doubtful that the teachings of Mumbo would have won 
such wide acceptance as to promote open hostility by September 1914 . 
Mumboism had developed considerable appeal among the Gusii by the end 
of the war years as a result of bad economic conditions, forced labor, and 
epidemic disease. What drew those who became involved -in the sect to 
Mumboism were these considerations of the real world and not, in most 
cases, the religious appeal. Mumboism had not attracted many devoted 
adherents in Gusiiland by the time World War I began. This is clearly 
indicated by a letter of the District Cormnissioner in 1918. 
During the year 1914-15, a new religion 'Mumbo' made its 
appearance in this district, having its chief attraction 
the doctrine that all white men would leave the protector-
ate ... Recently the religion made its appearance among 
the Kisii and a number of teachers began instructing the 
people. 
The fact that Mumboism was not involved in the attack on Kisii 
in 1914 may also be inferred from an examination of who took part and, 
more importantly, who did not take part. If Mumboism were influential 
enough to cause this attack and looting, then it is hard to explain why
only those Gusii 'living in the vicinity of the town were involved. It 
1s. H. Fazan, Report on Investigation Made Concerning the Worship of 
Mumbo, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2. 
2District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 28 November 1918, 
KNA: DC/KSI/3/2. Wipper quotes only the first part of the letter but 
not the second sentence. Wipperper, p. 891
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is also difficult to reconcile the fact that the Bogonko "clan" took
little or no part if, as Dr. Wipper maintains, they provided the "core 
of support for Mumboism" among the Gusii. 1 Many Bogonko were later 
active in what was regarded by the administration as Mumboism2, but 
in 1914 they were certainly not in the forefront in the rising against the 
British. 3 
It is thus apparent that the sack of Kisii in September 1914 was 
not the result of Mumbo teachings or agitation -- it was the result of Gusii 
dissatisfaction with the new ways of colonial rule. Although British 
administration had been in effect for seven years, most Gusii had not 
completely reconciled themselves to the new forms of authority. They 
wished to return to the days before the many bothersome controls intro-
duced by the British. When the administration withdrew from the station, 
those Gusii in the vicinity vented their hostility by damaging many of 
the buildings and carrying off the contents. This was a short and rela-
tively uncoordinated attack; it did not_,involve all Gusii by any means, 
but it did symbolize Gusii hatred of the alien presence and all it implied 
in Gusiiland. 
1 Wipper, p. 410. 
2
oistrict Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 1 August 1928. 
3rnterview: Mzee Ongaro, 2 July 1969. 
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After taking the form of self defense in 1905, early Gusii 
resistance to British rule involved attempts by some of the Getutu to 
stop the extension of colonial administration to themselves by re-
moving it from Gusiiland in 1908. An attempt was made on the life of 
the sole British official responsible for administering Gusiiland; 
once the attack was made, further attacks were launched against indi-
viduals and rules which owed their presence in Gusiiland to British 
rule. A further attack was made on what seemed to be the most obvious 
remains of the colonial system following the British withdrawal from 
Kisii in 1914. These two latter instances of armed resistance were the 
result, for the most part, not of religious and emotional or irrational 
appeals and forces, but of understandable grievances. First Gusii con-
tacts with the British and their early experiences of colonial rule 
produced antagonism among many of the Gusii, and some took up arms and 
engaged in hostile acts as a result. 
Not all Gusii forcibly opposed the British in 1905, 1908 and 1914, 
but these instances of resistance to colonial rule, though they failed 
to end the alien presence in Gusiiland, have considerable significance. 
Much of the later Gusii response to British rule and its innovations can 
be more easily understood against the early background of hostility. 
So, too, can the forms which later resistance to European domination took. 
The lesson had been clearly driven home that British rule could not 
be thrown off by armed force. Some therefore reconciled themselves to 
European authority. Nevertheless, for others the events of 1905, 1908 and 
1914 were not forgotten, nor were the heroes. They were to serve as 
inspiration for the next generation of opponents to colonial rule. 
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